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After gaining independence, African states embraced the idea of regional integration as an 
approach to boost economic development on the continent.  This was evident in the new 
regional organizations that were predominantly generated among developing states in the 
southern hemisphere.1 Majority of these organizations, e.g. Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), have 
continuously been striving to deepen social, political and most importantly economic 
integration and cooperation in Africa.  In an attempt to further the regional integration agenda, 
there have been quite a number of colonial cross-border arrangements with EU.  Assessed 
based on conventional integration theories by scholars like Ernst B. Haas, the prerequisites for 
effective regional economic integration in Africa, appear to be less successful, juxtaposed with 
the more developed and economically independent European Union.2 Although regional 
organizations like ECOWAS and SADC have managed to establish free trade areas (FTAs), they 
have failed to attain their agenda of establishing customs unions. Agendas of this kind among 
other things, are pertinent to consolidating the regional integration process. Even though 
several issues may be identified as causes of the inefficiency of the integration scheme on the 
continent, this paper explores the effect of north south trade agreements, in this case the 





                                                          
1 Peter Draper, Durrel Halleson, Philips Alves, et al., “SACU, Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue In Southern 
Africa″ South African Institute of International Affairs, no.15 (2007): 10, 
http://sarpn.org/documents/d0002411/SACU_SAIIA_Jan2007.pdf 
2 Anatasia Obydenkova et al., Comparative regionalism: Eurasian cooperation and European integration. The case 
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Africa’s declining share in global trade and production clearly shows that the continent 
continues to operate at the periphery of the global economy. According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), majority of sub-Saharan Africa’s 47 states 
are underdeveloped.3 Furthermore they have relatively small populations and low per capita 
income levels, which invariably affect the size of their markets.4 As a result, African states have 
leaned towards regional integration as a key tool, to drive their states into a novel era of 
economic growth and development.  
The dynamics and advancement of this regional integration process are massively affected and 
dependent on the revision of trade arrangements between the EU and ACP (African, Caribbean 
and Pacific) states enforced by the Cotonou agreement.5  Thus the previously established trade 
relations driven by unilateral preferences provided solely by the EU are expected to be 
governed by EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements). The intent is to control cooperation and 
trade, instituting new trade regimes between the ACP regions and the EU determined by clear 
and specific criteria.6 Concurrently, this new partnership is expected to facilitate all efforts for 
regional cooperation and implement the relevant measures to support emerging partner 
regions.  
                                                          
3 Africa's least developed: lands of opportunity, Africa Renewal Online, accessed February 10, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2011/africas-least-developed-lands-opportunity 
4 Peter Draper, Durrel Halleson, Philips Alves, et al., “SACU, Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue In Southern 
Africa″ South African Institute of International Affairs, no.15 (2007): 10, 
http://sarpn.org/documents/d0002411/SACU_SAIIA_Jan2007.pdf 
5 ACP-EU Cooperation After 2020: Towards a New Partnership?, Advisory Council On international Affairs accessed,  
February 10, 2017, http://aiv-advies.nl/download/b8e0a7d4-968c-43b9-89c0-2f6bb2164fd8.pdf 
6 Ibid.  
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However, more than a decade after the launch of the EPA negotiations in Africa, its beneficial 
impact on regional integration continues to be vague.7  This was evident during the 
negotiations, as they failed to factor in the already existing regional economic communities on 
the continent, further complicating the already frangible state of affairs.8 Hence, despite the 
EPAs key objective to further regional integration in Africa, it appears their present effect is 
more disintegration in the RECs.  Thus the main essence of this research is to assess the impact 
EPAs are having on regional integration by drawing from outcomes in two major regional blocs -
ECOWAS AND SADC.  
Chapter one of this study commences with a brief synopsis of the concept of regional 
integration, and the four key elements which states confront to facilitate this process. It then 
continues with a more expansive explanation of the concept by looking at an overview of 
regional integration. Based on the overview, the most relevant form of regional integration 
instituted in Africa is highlighted: economic integration.  It is then follows with a detailed 
explanation of this process by way of a description of the six levels of economic integration.  
Chapter two follows with an assessment of the ACP-EU Partnership, by laying-out the historical 
background of the trade relations between the two regions. It then looks at the Lomé 
Convention which symbolized the birth of the trade relationship between the EU and ACP. It 
then continues with an assessment of the EC bananas dispute which played a significant role in 
transforming the nature the EU-ACP trade arrangement from preferential to reciprocal. This is 
related to the next subject on the birth of the Cotonou Agreement.  
Chapter 3 assesses the first case study which is the ECOWAS EPA. It looks at the negotiation 
procedure and structure between the EU and ECOWAS regions. It then discusses the interim 
agreements signed by Ghana and Ivory Coast. This helps lay a foundation to finally assess the 
effect the EPA, in its entirety, has on integration in the region.  
                                                          
7 New Trade Pacts Threaten Regional Unity, Africa Renewal, accessed, February 10, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2008/new-trade-pacts-threaten-regional-unity 
8 Ibid.  
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Chapter 4 looks at the second case study which is the SADC EPA. It also focuses on the 
negotiation process and structure. Additionally it assesses the interim agreement which was 
signed by Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and Namibia. In conclusion it looks at 
the effects the agreement has on integration in the region.  
Finally, chapter 5 makes a comparative analysis of the ECOWAS and SADC EPA. Drawing from 
the analysis and the above case studies, it makes an assessment of the effects the EPAs 

















General Overview of Regional Integration 
 
1.1    Concept of Regional Integration  
Regional integration involves the growth of “economic, institutional, and political linkages 
between countries that share geographical proximity.”9 It is equally the advancement of 
interdependence between states through the eliminating of constraints and obstructions to 
support cooperation. Notwithstanding, this arrangement is further facilitated through the 
reduction of trade barriers between the involved parties. In establishing and sustaining regional 
integration, states are confronted with four key strategic decisions:    
1. States that will constitute the regional group.  
2. The external policy of the regional group towards non-members.  
3. The depth of the integration process, taking into consideration interdependence.  
4. The vastness of the integration process considering which areas of institutional, 
economic, political cohesiveness will be incorporated.10   
These core elements form the basis of the regional integration agenda and its relevance to 
global trade. However, to understand the concept better it is necessary to look at the regional 





                                                          
9 Vincent Tanyanyiwa, Constance Hakuna at al., “Challenges and Opportunities for Regional Integration in Africa: A 
Case Study of SADC″ Journal Of Humanities And Social Science  No.12 (2014) 106, http://iosrjournals.org/iosr-
jhss/papers/Vol19-issue12/Version-4/P019124103115.pdf  




1.2 Key Definitions 
The essence of regional integration lies in its capacity to give states which are distinct and 
separate the avenue to unite on the basis of common dependence and shared interest.11 
However relevant to this process, is the issue of state sovereignty to certain extents, to achieve 
a collective objective. Ernest Haas defined this notion from a political perspective as the, 
“process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift 
their loyalties, expectations and political proclivities toward a new center, whose institutions 
possess jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”12  
From an economic standpoint, it is a series of activities through which states within the same 
geographical region, unite to pursue like objectives and policies regarding issues of economic 
development or a particular economic field of shared benefits.13 This is usually, for the common 
benefit of all parties (participating states) involved. Conversely, from a trade perspective, it is 
expressed as the commercial policy of giving preferential treatment to a select group of nations 
within the configuration by eliminating or reducing trade barriers.14  
The leading theory supporting regional integration is however, centered on the work of Jacob 
Viner.15 According to Viner (1950) regional integration is not bound to create an advantageous 
outcome in economic efficiency.16 He was of the opinion that regional integration and 
specifically the impacts of trade creation, can potentially have trade diversion effects on 
participating states and even third party states that are non-party to any agreement.17 This is a 
                                                          
11 Ibid 
12 Boussiratou Gbadamassi et al., ″Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization: A comparative analysis of 




13 Ibid., 15 
14 Regional Integration and the EPAs, South Centre,  accessed February 10, 2017, 
https://www.southcentre.int/analytical-note-march-2007-5/#more-3745  
15 George C. Lwanda et al., ″Can EPAs strengthen regional integration in southern Africa: A qualitative analysis″ 
No.27 (2011):6  https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/10528743/can-epas-strengthen-regional-
integration-in-southern-africa-a-/5  
16 Ibid., 6 
17 Lwanda et al., ″Can EPAs strengthen regional integration in southern Africa: A qualitative analysis,″ 6 
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very relevant view that will be discussed further in a later section (under Regional Trade 
Agreements).  
Researchers such as, Vanek (1965),Ohyama (1972), and Kemp (1964) built further on Viner’s 
theory. The key difference in their opinion was,  
“It is always possible for a regional integration agreement, formed among an arbitrary 
group of countries, to structure itself in such a way as to make the member countries 
better off without making any of the non-member countries worse off.”18 
Years Later, Krugman (1991) developed the term “economic geography.”19  Which seeks to 
define the factors that lead to regional concentration of economic activity. It is founded on the 
notion that there is a desire for increasing returns to scale.20 Krugman’s analysis shows that the 
ultimate causes of the location of economic activity will be trade cost considerations and 
economies of scale.21 He further explains that, economies of scale can be developed in regional 
blocs by focusing production activity in a specific location instead of running different activities 
in separate countries.   
 
1.3 The development of Regional Integration  
It is thus evident based on early works by Viner that regional integration is not a new 
phenomenon. It emerged during the post war era in Europe through the formation of the ECSC 
(European Coal and Steel Community) in 1951, the EEC (European Economic Community) in 
1957 and the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) in 1960.22 The levels of economic growth 
                                                          
18 Report on Regional Cooperation in the ACP, ACP EU Joint Assembly, accessed February 10 2017, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/94_01/020_00_01_en.htm    
19 George C. Lwanda et al., ″Can EPAs strengthen regional integration in southern Africa: A qualitative analysis″ 
No.27 (2011):6  https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/10528743/can-epas-strengthen-regional-
integration-in-southern-africa-a-/5 
20 Ibid., 6 
21 Lwanda et al., ″Can EPAs strengthen regional integration in southern Africa: A qualitative analysis,″ 6 
22Boussiratou Gbadamassi et al., ″Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization: A comparative analysis of ECOWAS 




attained by the European community from this integration process acted as a catalyst to 
developing nations especially within the African continent to integrate their economies in the 
late 1950’s into the early 1960s.23 The aim was also to secure the benefits of economic 
integration while guarding themselves from the vast competition and know-how of the 
European Economic Community which had dominated the global trade arena. This further led 
to the creation of several integration structures worldwide such as LAFTA (The Latin American 
Free Trade Association) in 1960, CACM (Central America Common Market) in 1961, UDEAC 
(Central African Economic and Customs Union) in 1964, ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian 
Nations) (1976) and CFTA (Caribbean Free Trade Association) in 1968.24  
Within the African region, integration has been based on the customary model of political 
cooperation through economic cooperation and geographical proximity and contiguity of 
states.25 However, dominant external and internal forces are considerably transforming 
economic associations within the African continent and with the rest of the world at large. 
Relevant features of these changes are evident with the new trade geography, in which 
developed nations seek deeper cooperation with less developed states, mainly, through new 
institutions of international trade like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and bi-lateral trade 
agreements such as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).26 
Furthermore, the changes in the global trading system have been a major driving force in 
Africa’s regional integration agenda.27 With the evolving of the world trading regime in the last 
20 years, there has been a general understanding that free trade is essential for economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ation%20and%20Trade%20Liberalization%20A%20Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20Ecowas%20and%20Sadc%20
Trade%20Liberalization%20Schemes.pdf 
23 Caroline Freund, Emanuel Ornelas at al., ″Regional Trade Agreements“ Policy Research Working Paper No.5314 




24 Maurice Schiff et al., Regional Integration and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),2. 
25 Regional Integration and Trade in Africa: Augmented Gravity Model Approach, African Development Bank, 
accessed February 10, 2017, 
https://www.afdb.org/uploads/tx_llafdbpapers/Regional_Integration_Trade_in_Africa_1373530866.pdf  
26 Ibid.  
27 S K B, Asante Regionalism and Africa’s Development (1997) Macmillan Press Ltd London 
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growth.28 The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) which was established over 50 
years ago but later changed into the WTO has played a key role in the reduction of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers.29 This has propelled the expansion of world trade and greater integration of 
world markets. The response of regions and states response to these new developments have 
to a reasonable extent influenced their share of the benefits of the new dispensation of trade 
liberalization.  
Nonetheless, Africa has unfortunately had a marginal role in global trade, with supply-side 
constraints and restrictions in market access with the major economies being a primary 
cause.30 Additionally limited intra-African trade due to fragile regional integration has also 
played a key role in constraining prospects for learning-by-doing for African states. The 
domestic markets are not functioning at an optimal level to offer substantial avenues for or 
adequate support for the export sector to survive or endure during inevitable shocks in the 
international market.31  
It is for this reason that regional integration has become a critical focus for African states as this 
stands to be the ultimate tool to ensure a large market size for trade facilitation and a stimulus 
for regional economic development.  According to Adebayo Adedeji, “economic cooperation 
among African states is a sine qua non for the achievement of national socio economic goals, 
and not an “extra” to be given thought to after the process of development is well advanced.”32 
Thus due to the risky and extremely competitive international export market, a larger African 
                                                          
28 Regional Integration and Trade in Africa: Augmented Gravity Model Approach, African Development Bank, 
accessed February 10, 2017, 
https://www.afdb.org/uploads/tx_llafdbpapers/Regional_Integration_Trade_in_Africa_1373530866.pdf 
29The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, Word Trade Organization, accessed February 10, 2017 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm  
30 Ashford C. Chea et al., Sub-Saharan Africa and Global Trade: “What Sub-Saharan Africa needs to do to maximize 
the Benefits from Global Trade Integration, Increase Economic Growth and Reduce Poverty?″ International Journal 
of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 2, no.4 (2012) 360 
http://www.hrmars.com/admin/pics/726.pdf  
31 Ibid., 360  
32 Boussiratou Gbadamassi et al., ″Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization: A comparative analysis of 






market presents an advantage for corporations in the continent to learn by doing while 
emphasizing the necessity for deeper regional integration.  
 
1.4   Regional Economic Integration  
As previously discussed, regional integration has been the major objective of African states for 
the realization of economic development. Hence regional economic integration has taken 
center stage in national state policies in the continent.33 There are several levels of 
interdependence when dealing with regional economic integration. They range from fairly weak 
integration agreements to fairly robust and strong agreements. Generally speaking there are six 
stages of economic integration namely; a preferential trade agreement (also described as a 
preferential trade area), free trade area (FTA), a trade bloc, a common market, a customs union 
and an economic and monetary Union (the highest form of economic interdependence). Figure 


































No  No  No  No  No  
Free Trade 
Area (FTA)  
Yes No  No No  No  
Customs 
Union  
Yes Yes  No No  No  
Common 
Market  
Yes  Yes  Yes No  No  
Economic 
Union  
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  No  
Political 
Union  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Source: Development Planning Division, Working Paper Series No. 27 
 
 
I. Preferential Trade Area:  
Here member states impose lower tariffs on imports produced by other members rather than 
on imports from non-member states. This is done whilst preserving the privilege to single-
handedly control tariffs on imports from non-member states34.  
II. Free Trade Area:  
This happens to be the most fundamental type of economic cooperation. Here member states 
eliminate all barriers to trade amongst themselves but are allowed to unilaterally establish 
                                                          




trade policies with nonmember states.35 A typical example is NAFTA (the North Atlantic Free 
Trade Agreement).  
 
III. Common Market:  
This provides for the formation of economically integrated markets between member states. 
Here not only are trade barriers removed but also any impediments relating to the movement 
of capital and labor between member states.36 Similar to a customs union, member states 
establish a shared trade policy to govern trade with states that are nonmembers of the 
common market. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a good 
example of this.  
IV. Customs Union  
This type of integration allows for economic cooperation similar to that of a free trade zone. 
Additionally all barriers to trade are eliminated between member states. The key difference 
however between this form of integration and a free trade area is that the member states 
consent to engage in trade with non-member states in like fashion. An example is the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).37  
 
V. Economic and Monetary Union 
                                                          
35 Jo-Ann Crawford et al., The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements (Geneva-WTO Publications), 3. 
36 Ibid,. 3 





Here states enter into an economic cooperation to eliminate barriers to trade and implement 
shared economic policies.38 In this cohesive economic union member states also adopt a 
common currency. A typical example is the EMU (European Economic and Monetary Union).  
 
VI. Trade Bloc  
This is simply an intergovernmental agreement that entails the removal of regional barriers to 
trade. Tariffs or non-tariffs barriers are either reduced or completely removed. Some trading 
blocs in creating economic cooperation have led to agreements that are more substantive than 
others.39  
Underpinning the above stages of regional economic integration is the key concept of Regional 
trade agreements and to better analyze the effects of the EPA on regional integration in Africa 
it is pertinent to effectively discuss regional trade agreements.  
 
1.5 Regional trade agreements  
Relevant to this research and even regional integration as a whole is Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs). In simplified terms RTAs are intergovernmental agreements that promote 
and regulate trade undertakings in particular regions of the world. Regional trade agreements 
have the possibility of exclusively seeking trade integration or could likely constitute a broader 
regional integration agreement that aspires for deeper integration consisting of governance, 
political matters and trade policies. The main goal of RTAs is the elimination of trade barriers 
between contracting parties.  
The WTO recognizes RTAs as agreements that adhere to particular laid out standards. As RTAs 
increasingly cover both trade in goods and services, the standards that pertain to trade in goods 
                                                          
38 European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Investopedia accessed, February 10, 2017 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/emu.asp  




is “substantially all trade”40 and for services they extend to “substantial sectoral coverage.”41 
Although the World Trade Organization is fundamentally the only institution that governs 
global trade, the increase in the rate at which RTAs are being sought after makes them a force 
to be reckoned with in the multilateral trading system.  
Nevertheless, to ensure that RTAs complement and not substitute the global trading system, 
the WTO has established certain regulations that must be fulfilled to ensure compatibility. The 
fulfillment of these regulations is guaranteed by the obligation to give notice under GATS article 
V 7(a) and GATT article XXIV 7 (a).42 These regulations compel members of an RTA to inform the 
WTO about their instituted agreements. They also require contracting parties to undergo an 
evaluation process in a committee established for RTAs and assess whether they meet the 
requirements specified in them.43  
Significantly, over 250 of them have been notified to the WTO.44 Additionally it is estimated 
that more than half of global trade is presently undertaken within prospective or already 
legitimized regional trade agreements. This new trend of forming RTAs has therefore influenced 
a shift from the traditional notion of regional integration being primarily between states of 
close geographical proximity.45 States are now extending their relations beyond their neighbors 
and this is evident in the novel development of North-South regional trade agreements.  
Furthermore it is imperative to note that, this fast growing trade relation between developed 
and developing states has not only undermined geographical immediacy but further 
incorporated a broader range of negotiating regions comprising of trade in services.46 Some 
                                                          
40 The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence, Word Trade Organization, 
accessed, February 10, 2017, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf  
41 Ibid.  
42 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, World Trade Organization, accessed February 10, 2017, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm 
43 Ibid. 
44 Caroline Freund et al., “Regional Trade Agreements“ Policy Research Working Paper no.5314 (2010) 3 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=312025116122112126101122006071127120085035019009034090
07412401304406303802401705600102806811800610002607003306709807306707708908300010902302407107
4005027119087078025000125019111004073001002&EXT=pdf   
45 Ibid.,3  




examples of the North-South regional trade agreements comprise of the US-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) of 2003, the EU South Africa Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement 
(TDCA) of 1999, and the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the ACP 
countries (EPAs).47  
Trade relations, which were once founded on unilateral non-reciprocal preferences given to 
developing states through North-South relations, are now being changed to reciprocal trade 
agreements covering a vast range of areas.48 This is illustrated in the conversion of the 
preference-giving Lomé Convention to the reciprocity centered Cotonou Agreement between 
the 79 ACP states and the EU. Alternative preferential trade agreements also include Japanese 
and Canadian Generalized System of Preferences for developing states and the United States’ 
African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) and its Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP). 
However, by negotiating reciprocal regional trade agreements like the EPAs, developing states 
give up their advantageous rights to non-reciprocal agreements. This is a policy change that has 
substantial consequences on developing state’s policy options and most importantly regional 
integration arrangements specifically in the case of African states.  
 Relevant to the discussion on liberalization initiatives or the removal of trade barriers under 
RTAs is ‘trade creation.’49 This is a vital term used when these initiatives generate trade that 
would not have otherwise existed. These initiatives lead to a specific country receiving the 
supply of goods or/and services from the most competent producer of the product. As a result, 
trade creation usually generates an output of enhanced economic welfare. On the other hand, 
‘trade diversion’ describes biased trade liberalization which deters or diverts trade away from 
the more competent supplier not party to the RTA, to the advantage of the less competent 
supplier party to the RTA. In certain cases trade diversion may be robust enough to offset trade 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 CARICOM: Challenges and Opportunities for Caribbean Economic Integration, CRS Report for Congress accessed 
February 11, 2017 http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAR_EU/Studies/CRSCARICOM_Challenges_e.pdf  






creating impacts and thus minimize a state’s national welfare. Equally, in certain situations 
national welfare may advance in spite of trade diversion. 
An illustration of trade creation is seen in table 1.1.  Take for example that the cost of 
production of Textiles in Nigeria; Ghana and Indonesia are $50, $40 and $30 respectively. In this 
case no tariffs are imposed on Textiles from Indonesia and Ghana by Nigeria. This means 
Nigeria would opt to import its palm oil from Indonesia before considering Ghana if her 
obligation is not totally met by the low-cost producer (Indonesia).  
 
 
Figure 2: Price of Textiles in Nigeria, Ghana and Indonesia  
Country  Cost of Production ($) 
Nigeria 50  
Ghana  40  
Indonesia   30 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
 Trade Diversion 
All the same, if Nigeria and Ghana for example decide to have an FTA with a common external 
tariff, yet Nigeria imposes a 50% non-discriminatory import duty on Textiles products the 
results will be as follows: 
Figure 3: Price of Textiles in Nigeria, Ghana and Indonesia after 50% import duty 
Country  Cost of Production ($) 
Nigeria  50 
Ghana  40 
Indonesia 45 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
29 
 
Thus Nigeria will be importing palm oil from Ghana at the price of $40. Based on this 
development, import would have moved from the cheapest supplier (Indonesia) to the high 
cost supplier Ghana that is within the FTA or customs union. This scenario is thus termed as 
trade diversion from Indonesia whereby import from a more effective producing state has been 
replaced by imports from a less effective state within an economic integration union. Yet, it also 
implies trade creation towards Ghana.  
 According to Robinson (1996) a key determining factor of the accomplishment of any regional 
trade agreement is that the dissemination or losses and/or gains should be cautiously 
assessed.50 The second step is to establish cautiously through-out, recompense mechanisms.51 
Underpinning, all this is that, for an RTA to be successful all members must be ready to forgo 
some amount of state sovereignty to a supranational body.52 Hence an approach of this nature 
identifies that in most cases there will usually be an outcome of winners and losers, a trend 
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Africa and EU Trade Relations 
 
 2.1 ACP-EU Partnership  
 
The relationship between the ACP states and the EU can be traced back to 1957 when the 
European Common Market formed under the Treaty of Rome was established.53 The main 
purpose of the treaty was to finally institute a joint market between European states. This 
arrangement was however expected to encounter complications, due to its scheme that 
provided preferential treatment to external regions with which certain members still had 
colonial ties.54 Moreover, in the event where a common market was instituted among the 
European states it would imply the application of a common external tariff to all imports into 
the region excluding those from former colonies.55  
As a result, France insisted that Part IV was incorporated into the agreement, thus creating a 
legal basis to permit the issuing of preferential treatment to imported products from previous 
colonies.56 Furthermore the customs duties imposed on imports from other states with special 
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relations with Europeans states and former colonies had to be gradually repealed.57 This also 
included the abolition of tariffs pertaining to products from member states.  
Since then, the EU-ACP trade relationship has been controlled by a number of conventions 
starting from the Yaoundé I to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA).58  The Yaoundé 
convention paved the way for the Lomé Agreements (Lome I 1976, Lome II 1981, Lome III 1985, 
Lome IV 1989) which was tailored towards promoting economic integration between the 
Associated African and Malagache countries and the European Common Market.59 It created a 
trade and support system that allowed products from previous European colonies free entry to 
the European market. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to further discuss the agreement 
that significantly influenced trade relations between the EC and African states.  
 
 
2.2 The Lomé Convention 
As already mentioned, the Lomé Convention (a preferential trade arrangement) was pivotal to 
the trade relationship between the EC and ACP.60  It was categorized as a highly inventive 
development cooperation trade regime. Non-reciprocal trade preferences and numerous 
export price stabilization mechanisms, including foreseeable aid flows with its administration 
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was delegated solely to the ACP.61 The Lomé agreements were thus perceived to be very 
advanced strategies that would eventually support governments of ACP states to attain their 
development objectives.  
However over the years, especially after the cold war, the Lomé convention came under 
immense pressure.62  This ultimately affected the arrangement’s capacity to achieve expected 
results.  Thus although the Lomé Convention provided ACP countries with preferential access to 
EU markets, their share in EU imports declined from almost 8 percent in 1975 to 2.8 percent in 
2000.63  Furthermore it was quite remarkable that developing states which were not even ACP 
members and which did not profit from the preferential trade agreement performed better in 
their exports to the EU than the ACP states.64 This surprise outcome was such that, commodity 
protocols and the export price stabilization procedures which provided sustenance to several 
small ACP states did not create the much required export diversification of the ACP.  
Additionally, in 2007 more than three quarters of imports that entered the EU from the ACP 
comprised of primary goods largely energy (42%) and agricultural products (23.8%).65 Also 
significant was the fact that 31 ACP states in 2006 depended solely on one agricultural product 
for over 20 percent of their total export incomes, thus resulting in 10.2 percent of EU 
agricultural imports coming from the ACP.66 Similarly in 2007 the sum of goods from the ACP 
barely accounted for 2.82 percent of the EU’s total imports.67 Thus the decline of prices on the 
EU market owing to its common agricultural policy meant that ACP exports experienced 
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tremendous loss from agricultural exports. Besides all the unsatisfactory outcomes of the 
preferential trade regime of the EU in favor of ACP states there  was growing tension between 
the obligations of the WTO and the preferential arrangement.  
The preferential access the ACP obtained to EU markets at reduced or zero tariffs without the 
need for reciprocity was viewed as a violation of the MFN (Most Favored Nation) principle.68 
Previously, parties to the GATT accepted certain preference programmes as vehicles of 
economic development and trade liberalization for developing states.  They incorporated them 
in a number of waivers safeguarded under the GATT for the Lomé Conventions.  
However in 1979, after the adoption of the enabling clause by parties to the GATT a deviation 
was made from the MFN principle at the end of the famous Tokyo round.69 Additionally the 
intrinsic prejudice between ACP and non-ACP developing states on historical lines (since the 
ACP members  primarily comprise of former European colonies) did not conform to the WTO 
criteria and thus failed to fall under the enabling clause.70 The clause on the other hand 
permitted developed states to differentiate in favor of developing states but did not permit 
developing states to discriminate amongst themselves. Therefore certain preferential 
treatment like those given to the ACP states was not covered by the enabling clause unless it 
was on the basis of justifiable needs.71  
The relationship of the ACP countries with the EC lasted for a reasonable period of time without 
objections from parties to the GATT. The trade arrangement was governed by the frequent 
modification of the Lomé Convention. In spite the effort to maintain this preferential trade 
relationship, the buildup of political and socio-economic changes in the ACP states; including 
critical tension on the international scene, emphasized the need for a re-examination of 
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cooperation among the two regions.72 The turn of events reached a climax in the mid-1990s 
when the legitimacy of the trade arrangement was tested in the EC-Bananas dispute. The 
aftermath of this case led to a turnaround in the trade relations between the ACP states and 
the EU. 
 
2.3 The EC Bananas dispute I, II and III   
 
The EC bananas dispute consisted of three separate GATT/WTO cases.73 The first two cases 
Bananas I and II were introduced under the GATT 1947 by five banana supplying Latin American 
states namely- Nicaragua, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Venezuela.74 As stated above, 
the preferential treatment ACP states gained from the EU continued without any objections 
from the parties to the GATT. In 1993 following the EC-bananas dispute I & II, specific meaning 
was finally given to the compatibility and legality of the ongoing preferential treatment in 
accordance with GATT provisions.75 The interpretation was evident in the introduction of 
Regulation 404/93 by the EU on 1 July 1993 which underscored favorable treatment of imports 
from ACP states and local producers.76  
The regulation instituted by the EU did two noteworthy things. First it created a tariff system 
and highlighted certain key objectives listed in the details of the preamble.77 These included but 
were not limited to, the permitting of the gratis movement within the EC region, a shared 
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market for goods from the agricultural sector, and the recognition of the international 
commitments of the EC particularly the Lomé Convention. 78 
Prior to the institution of the novel regulation, 62% of banana imports into the EC originated 
from Latin America in comparison to 18% which originated from the ACP states. Thus based on 
the directive of the displeased Latin American states (Nicaragua, Colombia, Costa Rica 
Guatemala and Venezuela) two separate GATT panels were created to decide on the legitimacy 
of the newly introduced banana arrangement.79 The deduction the panel reached in its 1993 
and 1994 unimplemented reports was that, the preferential treatment extended to ACP 
countries was not in accordance with the principles of the GATT.80 The report released in 1993 
expressed the view that some areas of the banana trade arrangement engaged in by certain EC 
member states was not in accordance with a number of GATT obligations.  
Similarly, it was discovered that based on the panel report of 1994, certain areas of the shared 
cooperation for the trade in banana would be non-conforming to GATT rules after 1 July 1993.81 
It also indicated that, the Lomé Convention comprised of states that were not parties to the 
GATT and simultaneously not in accordance with provisions under article XXIV of the 
agreement. The main issue underlined in this regard, was the non-reciprocity clause and the 
point that the preferential trade arrangement did not foster the liberalization of “substantially 
all trade″82 between ACP countries and the EC. As a result the Lomé Convention was found as 
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an illegitimate ground to validate the incongruities for preferential treatment under article 1 of 
the GATT regarding imported bananas from the ACP.83  
 Moreover, due to a lack of consensus by the GATT contracting parties and the EC, neither of 
the two reports was adopted, mainly because, it is basic procedure under the GATT that a 
consensus is necessary for the adoption of panel reports.84 Despite the lack of consensus, the 
panel decision led to the amendment of the EC banana trade arrangement. This entailed four of 
the disgruntled states entering into a new trade relationship with the EC, namely the 
Framework Agreement on Bananas (BFA). Furthermore in exchange for not requesting the 
adoption of the panel report, these four states demanded some concessions which consisted of 
the power to issue export certificates and the allocation of specific quotas.  
 
i. EC Bananas III Dispute 
All the same, it is the EC Bananas III case that is specifically linked to the decision that 
influenced the renegotiation of the Lomé convention. Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico 
and the US brought a claim against the EC in 1995 for its banana trade arrangement. The 
complaint pertained to the sale, importation and distribution of bananas instituted by the 
council regulation (EEC) 404/93 of February 1993.85 It was also centered on the joint 
cooperation of the trade in bananas and ensuing EC administrative and legislation provisions 
including those under the BFA. However, it is essential to note that there were two main 
elements that the claim pertaining to the EC banana trade arrangement focused on, namely, 
the EC’s licensing methods non-traditional ACP bananas (specifically the activity function rules 
operator category rules) and country specific distribution of tariff quotas.  
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The findings and conclusion of the panel highlighted that the apportionment of tariff quotas to 
a select few instead of all members based on their considerable interest in exporting bananas 
to the EC was not in accordance with article XXII of the GATT.86 This provision of the GATT is 
highly relevant in this case since it deals with the non-discriminatory administration of 
quantitative limitations. Likewise, it was also discovered that certain features of the EC licensing 
arrangement discriminated against the import of bananas from Latin American states. It 
created disadvantageous situations for competition in comparison with the beneficial 
arrangement for the import of bananas from the ACP.87  This was a violation of articles 1.2 and 
1.3 of the licensing agreement.88 More importantly, due to the banana trade arrangement’s 
impact on the service providers of the complaining parties, the agreement was held to be 
nonconforming with the MFN clause in article II of the GATT and article XVII of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).89 The panel thus suggested that the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB), require the EC to align its import arrangement in accordance with its commitments 
under the Licensing agreement, GATS and GATT.90  
Hence, the EC sought a GATT/WTO waiver to permit it to maintain its preferential agreement 
with the ACP states. A waiver was granted but expected to terminate by the year 2000.91  
Parties to the Lomé Convention thus have to develop a trade relationship that was compliant 
with their commitments under the WTO. This led to the creation of the CPA (Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement) in 2000.  
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2.4   Cotonou Agreement 
As mentioned previously the creation of the current ACP and EU arrangement was as a result of 
a waiver approved by members of the WTO. After the EC-Bananas dispute, panels of the GATT 
encouraged the EU to pursue a waiver for its non-reciprocal trade agreement with ACP states. 
However the process involved in obtaining the waiver proved rather challenging as some Latin 
American banana exporting states, the Philippines and Thailand committed to blocking the 
procedure. It took compensatory amendments in the nature of concessions for the waiver to be 
eventually granted in November 2001. Moreover before that date, in an attempt to guarantee 
full compliance with WTO obligations in June 2000, the EU signed the Cotonou Agreement with 
77 ACP states. The agreement came into effect in April 2003 and its basic objective is reflected 
in Article 36 (1) which stipulates that  
“In view of the objectives and principles set out above, the Parties agree to conclude new 
World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible trading arrangements, removing progressively 
barriers between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade."92 
There are five main pillars underpinning the Cotonou agreement, including key objectives to 
alleviate poverty, establish new economic and trade partnerships as well as the development of 
a more strategic approach to cooperation.93 The agreement further provides for the 
negotiation of the EPAs and for its full implementation by 2007.94 Within the agreement, it is 
explained that the EPAs must institute a time frame for the gradual elimination of trade barriers 
between the contracting parties in conformity with article XXIV of the GATT.95 Additionally the 
agreement includes a revision clause which makes provision for its modification every five 
years.96 Based on this clause, in May 2004, negotiations were launched to re-examine the CPA 
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and this was finally concluded in February 2005.97 The overarching purpose of the re-
examination procedure was to develop the quality and efficiency of the ACP-EU partnership, 
thus leading to the birth of the Economic Partnership Agreement.  
 
2.5 The Economic Partnership Agreements 
The weaknesses of the Lomé Conventions provided a backdrop for the creation of the Cotonou 
agreement. To address these challenges the ACP and the EU consented to drastically reform of 
the ACP-EU trade arrangement, through deliberations on a new development framework 
known as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).98 The EPAs have not only efficiently 
substituted a trade agreement branded by unilateral trade preferences (Lomé Convention), but 
have also been perceived as compatible with article XXIV of the GATT and at the while being 
more integrated and development driven.99  
The economic partnership agreements are characterized as free trade arrangements. They are 
negotiated by the 75 ACP member states and the EC on behalf of the EU member states. The 
founding principle of this trade arrangement is the concept of reciprocity, thus retreating from 
decades of unilateral trade preferences by members of the EU to ACP countries.  
Article 37 (1) of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), it establishes that negotiations on 
the EPAs would commence in September 2002 and finally conclude no later than December 
2007.100 At the launch of the negotiations ACP states were split into six different regional 
groupings and each discussed a separate EPA agreement with the EC. The Cotonou Agreement 
further lays out four basic principles on which the EPA should be established.  
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I. Reciprocity:  One of the key elements of an economic partnership agreement is the 
institution of an FTA. This intent is to gradually eliminate substantially all restrictions to 
trade between the parties involved.101 Furthermore it is a significant shift in the EU-ACP 
trade relationship and a fundamental necessity to ensure that the EPAs are WTO 
compliant, in this case particularly compliant with Article XXIV of the GATT. Moreover it 
signifies the first time ACP states would, on a reciprocal basis, have their markets open 
to products from the EU in an attempt to maintain their preferential entry to the EU 
market. The predominant justification for reciprocity rests on the norm that the ACP 
states liberalizing their markets in favour of the EU will augment competition with the 
economies of the ACP. Hence motivating foreign and local investment and the essential 
modification of their economies would foster development and growth.  
 
II. Differentiation: substantial value is directed towards special treatment and 
differentiation which confirms the North-South feature of the trade relationship. 
According to article 35.3 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the EPAs will factor in 
the various stages of development of the contracting parties.102 Thus the EPAs are 
required to provide adequate room for special and differential treatment, asymmetry 
and flexibility. Moreover, small and vulnerable economies, landlocked states and small 
islands including LDCs are particularly expected to gain from differential and special 
treatment.  
 
III. Development: it is pertinent that the EPA negotiations are put in the context of the 
entire development goals of the CPA and ACP states. In order for the EPAs to be 
beneficial to the ACP countries it must be “politically sustainable, economically 
meaningful and socially acceptable.”103 Therefore the EPAs cannot be characterized as 
regular trade arrangements. Instead they are constructed and designed to be 
                                                          
101 Article 37(7), Cotonou Agreement  
102 Ibid. 
103 Economic partnership agreements (EPAs): the ACP regions and their relations with the EU, European Centre for 




development-centered agreements to facilitate economic growth and development in 
ACP states. This will eventually aid in eradicating high levels of poverty.  
 
Regionalism: the EU evidently anticipates its negotiations with the ACP regional groups 
although it has not entirely ruled out the likelihood of finalizing agreements with 
individual states; an arrangement known as interim agreements. The norm of 
establishing upcoming trade cooperation on regional integration originates from the 
belief that regional integration is a fundamental means towards deeper integration into 
the global economy. It is additionally a stepping stone for the stimulation of investment 
and securing the needed trade restructurings (CPA Art. 35.2).104 Thus ensuring the 
implementation of the EPAs within the various regional blocks is fundamental to the 












                                                          





 ECOWAS EPA 
 
Introduction 
Since independence there has been significant support from African heads of state for regional 
integration. This has become an essential element of their development goals evident in the 
several regional integration arrangements (RIAs) in the continent. The West African sub-region 
has been to a large extent one of the success stories of deeper integration in Africa. 105 
Established on 28 may 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
consists of 15 West African countries.106 Within its ambit is another integration arrangement 
known as the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Additionally, ECOWAS members 
have significantly improved macro-economically by attaining growth rates above 5%, placing 
them with the most vigorous developing regions in the world.107  
ECOWAS which reflects the African paradigm for integration follows a linear market model.108 
This form of integration comprises of a step by step approach beginning with the integration of 
labour, goods and capital markets, ultimately leading to fiscal and monetary amalgamation. A 
process that usually starts with a Free trade Area (FTA), a customs union, common market and 
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then followed by the incorporation of fiscal and monetary matters to finally institute the 
economic union.109  
The EU for a number of years has been one of Africa’s main investment, development and trade 
partners. As already highlighted in the previous chapter, trade between the two regions was 
regulated by a number of Lomé Conventions, thereby giving African states with the exclusion of 
South Africa, unilateral advantageous access to EU markets. It was in June 2000 that African 
countries and the EU took the progressive step of ratifying the Cotonou Agreement which 
enabled talks of WTO acquiescent Economic Partnership Agreements.110 It is evident that the 
nonreciprocal agreements under the Lomé Convention would have to be altered to make room 
for a new policy arrangement under the EPA. The proposed direction was for the individual 
states to unilaterally disregard all quantitative restrictions and tariffs that made up the general 
system of preference in Lomé.111 This would then be substituted with a reciprocal trade 
liberalization arrangement for virtually all ongoing trade among the EU and ECOWAS states.  
The fundamental objectives of the ECOWAS-EPA include but are not limited to:  
I. Ensuring developing and least developed countries gain additional cutbacks off 
tariff appreciation in EU markets, 
II. Instituting the steady liberalization of ECOWAS countries markets towards the 
EU in accordance with WTO rules,  
III. The considerable minimization of policies that interfere with trade in exchange 
for the removal of preferential treatment and the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers to trade, 
IV. To take into full consideration the peculiar developmental interests and 
demands of the ECOWAS region.112 
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The EPA in principle is intended to be adjustable within the confines of the WTO provisions in 
instituting the time frame of product coverage, interim periods and the level of 
disproportionalities; in the planned schedule for eliminating the different market blockages.113 
Moreover contrary to WTO law, the exact threshold at which goods can be exempt from 
liberalization has still not been established although it has been a key item of discussion. 
Nonetheless there is much optimism that most, if not all products will be included in the 
proposal for reciprocal liberalization.114 Thus despite the term “substantially all”115 not being 
clearly articulated, the EU has over the years expressed its view on its meaning in WTO talks. It 
has proposed a quantifiable approach in interpretation as pertaining to the amount of trade 
covered, instead of qualitative analysis which is seen as ideal by certain members in the 
WTO.116 Article XXIV of the WTO agreement, explains “substantially all”117 as 80% to 90% of all 
trade between contracting parties.118 This indicates that the ECOWAS states are likely to be 





3.1  Negotiation Principles 
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The general negotiating directive of the EPA is to create procedures that safeguard complete 
adherence of RTAs between the EU and ACP countries with appropriate WTO requirements.120  
The quintessence of the EPA presents a series of amendments to the conventional trade 
relations between ACP countries and the EU. Although the goal is to guarantee that the 
accomplishments of the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions are sustained, it is also evident that 
the trade relations between the EU and ACP will have to be significantly restructured to ensure 
that they become compatible with WTO regulations.  
The EPA negotiations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) have been in two 
major phases. The first phase of negotiations resulted in the adoption of a joint report by the EC 
Commissionaires for Trade and the Ministers of ACP countries.121 Although there were some 
issues left pending at the end of this phase, the general outcome showed substantial levels of 
convergence.  
The direct EPA talks with ECOWAS states  (Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, 
Gambia, Cote d’voire, Guinea, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Senegal Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo)  
was launched on the 6th October 2003.122 The directives of negotiations focused on these key 
points: the development of a Free Trade Area (FTA) beginning by 1st January 2008 between the 
EC and the West African region; cooperation on trade related issues, priority to development 
and poverty reduction, improving competitiveness, improving the market access for West 
African export products; and deepening the West African integration process.  
The actual blueprint for the agreement was adopted on the 4th of August 2004. It outlines the 
strategies, objectives and processes for the negotiations, taking into consideration a proposed 
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schedule and problems likely to arise.123 Furthermore, the structure of the agreement was 
organized around 5 technical concepts. These are; an free trade area, customs union &trade 
facilitation; quality control, norms and related services; technical barriers to trade and sanitary 
and phytosanitary (TBT & SPS) measures; service, intellectual property; and productive 
sectors.124  
 Notwithstanding, the well outlined roadmap for the negotiations, the subsequent years 
following its adoption in 2004 showed minimal progress; more or less thwarting ECOWAS’ goal 
of concluding a complete regional EPA by June 2009.125 Coupled with this, in the last period of 
the year 2007, the already long drawn-out negotiations between the West African sub-region 
and the EC were additionally side-tracked. It was substituted with bilateral negotiations 
between the EC and individual countries in the region.   This fostered the ratification of interim 
agreements by Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.  Notwithstanding these setbacks, in 2008 negotiations 
proceeded with the forging of a comprehensive action plan.126   
 
 
3.2 Negotiating Structure  
Negotiations were conducted on the ECOWAS side by the Regional Negotiating Committee 
(RNC) and that of the EU by the European Commission.127 The talks were at three levels i.e. that 
of chief negotiator, the senior officials and the technical experts.128 At the level of chief 
negotiators, the Regional Negotiating Committee (RNC) was directed by the ECOWAS Executive 
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Secretary assisted by the head of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
Commission. Member states were also permitted to elect as part of the delegation, three 
experts.129 At the senior officials’ level, the RNC delegation was headed by the ECOWAS Deputy 
Executive Secretary for Policy Harmonization with the assistance of the WAEMU Commissioner 
for Tax, Customs, and Trade Policy. At the technical experts’ level, the delegation comprised of 
the directors of trade from the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the WAEMU Commission.130   
Additionally, a joint group was created to give coordinating support and secretarial services to 
this round of talks. The Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) was also established to ensure 
coherence and connectedness between development cooperation funding and the EPA 
negotiations. It is also relevant to note that, the hands-on method decided on for the procedure 
of the talks allowed for the participation of non-sate actors at every level of the negotiations, to 
guarantee that their opinions were also taken into consideration.131  
 
3.3 Issues Raised  
I. Cost of Reciprocity  
The cost of allowing the EU greater access to the ECOWAS market was a central issue of the 
negotiations between the two parties. The probable adverse implications that can arise as an 
outcome of this big step was highlighted under two main areas. First, opening trade with the EU 
could potentially escalate competition on the local markets. Although internationally 
advantageous for consumers, it can affect firms and local producers who mostly have 
constrained capacity scope, to compete with products from the EU due to supply-side 
limitations.  
                                                          
129 Overview of the Regional EPA Negotiations 
130 Overview of the Regional EPA Negotiations, In Brief, Accessed October 18, 2016, http://ecdpm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/IB-14B-Overview-Regional-EPA-Negotiations-West-Africa-EU-EPA-2006.pdf 




Again, tariff liberalization can cause a substantial decrease in government revenues, thus 
resulting in immense reductions in public expenditure especially for sectors such as education 
and health. It is a fact that majority of West African states are highly reliant on customs duties 
which make up an average of 2.5% of GDP and 14.7% of government revenue.132 This is very 
significant for states like Gambia and Sierra Leone which are significantly dependent on imports 
and are already under pressure in relation to the enforcement of the ECOWAS CET. 
 
II. Supply-Side Constraints  
A crucial objective for ECOWAS states is to guarantee that the EPA procedure supports growth 
and development, allowing for the clear indication that market access hardly connotes a step 
towards development and economic diversification.133 The unsatisfactory outcomes from the 
Lomé preferential and non-reciprocal trade system serve as a good stimulus for this cause. The 
main aim of ECOWAS has been to establish through this process, timely technical and financial 
assistance to improve supply capacity, competiveness, and a favourable business setting. The 
goal here is to support the economies in the region while ensuring they benefit from their trade 
relation with the EU. The areas considered for support were infrastructure services, human 
resource development, macroeconomic policy, transport and enterprise upgrading.134  
 
III. Market Access  
The EPA negotiations provided an avenue for ECOWAS states to guarantee more lucrative entry 
into the European Union market in accordance with WTO requirements for vital export 
products. Although it was established that the ECOWAS region would be awarded an 
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“Everything but Arms”135 style duty, it is not sufficient to enhance access to EU markets. It is for 
this reason, that emphasis was placed on developing ECOWAS member states’ capacity to 
adhere to the European Union’s rules of origin, technical barriers to trade and  especially its 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS).136  
 
 
IV. Agriculture  
Agriculture is at the core of the ECOWAS economy. Thus, one of the key goals here was to find 
in cooperation with farmers, organizations and the private sector, a shared category of items 
which should be considered with safeguard mechanisms exempted from the trade liberalization 
scheme.137 Additionally the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its effects 
in respect to declines in market prices and trade distortion were addressed. Furthermore 
concerning the entry of goods from the ECOWAs region into the EU market, the issue of 
adherence to the rules of origin and SPS measures was raised and pursued enthusiastically in 
the negotiations.138  This led to the conclusion that, tailored and adequately advanced 
programmes must be formulated and enforced to improve competiveness and the supply 
capacity of the agriculture sector in conjunction with ensuring regional inventiveness.  
 
 
V. Regional Integration 
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Regional integration has been a fundamental objective of the EPA negotiation process, mainly 
because it is a key to championing the assimilation of ECOWAS states into the global 
economy.139 Although substantial results have been achieved in the WAEMU grouping with its 
finalized monetary union, the integration process in ECOWAS is still far from completion. Thus 
the EPA negotiations, focused on the extent to which issues like tariff and non-tariff barriers 
impeding regional trade would be addressed. Moreover, there are several challenges the 
ECOWAS region is encountering in respect to the implementation of regional decisions on a 
national level. A typical example was clear in the participation of Mauritania in the ECOWAS-EU 
EPA, while not being a member of ECOWAS, having withdrawn in 2001 due to internal political 
unrest.140  Hence, the goal of the negotiations was to ensure that the EPA advances the region’s 





3.4 Interim Agreements (Ghana and Ivory Coast) 
As previously mentioned, during the negotiations for the ratification of a regional EPA, Ivory 
Coast and Ghana each signed an interim EPA (IEPA). Although the agreement signed by the two 
parties are very much alike, they are clearly country specific and talks for a complete regional 
ECOWAS EPA will eventually replace these interim agreements.141  Both Ghana and Ivory Coast 
initialed their IEPA in December 2007.142 It is however interesting to note that, Ghana has 
experienced considerable changes, mainly in its annexes and standstill clause since then. The 
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clause for example was reviewed to include a common tariff for the ECOWAS region (CET).143 
Annex II of the agreement which outlines the limits of Ghana’s timetable for the liberalization 
of its economy, was also modified. It was changed from the obligation to slowly “liberalize 
certain products within a category known as group A in five tranches (2009-2013)”144 to the 
commitment to liberalize these products in the Group A category by January 1, 2013.  
Additionally, annex II as a result of certain amendments now consists of an extra levy on the CIF 
(Cost, Insurance and Freight) for Export Development and Agriculture Investment Banking, 
extending to the end of 2017.145 Nevertheless, the EPA interim agreement focuses solely on the 
trade in goods and does not extend to other sectors of liberalization such as government 
procurement and trade in service.  
With regards to Ivory Coast, it began its first phase of tariff dismantling in the early months of 
2008 and projected to complete the process by 2022.146 The first tranche of goods liberalized 
over a period of five years characterized roughly 60% of the country’s imports from the EU in 
the years 2004 to 2006.  Moreover with less than 10% of imports bound for tariff cuts starting 
from 2018, it appears that Cote d’Ivoire’s liberalization process was profoundly front-loaded.147 
Looking at market access offer for example, since 1st January, 2008 imports from Ghana have 
gone into the EU free of duty and quotas. In reciprocity, Ghana committed to liberalizing 80% of 
goods from the EU signifying 81% of tariff lines over a period of 15 years (January 2008 to 
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January 2022).148 Cote d’Ivoire, on the other hand liberalized 81 percent of imports from the EU 
which represents 89% of tariff lines.  Additionally, its liberalization schedule is divided into 
three tranches while that of Ghana is divided into five.149  
Cote d’Ivoire’s first tranche 2008-2012 consists of 59.5% of goods liberalized, the second 2013-
2017 consists of 10.6% of goods to be liberalized, and the third tranche 2018-2022 consists of 
9.9 percent of goods bound to be liberalized, constituting 80% of its market.150  In respect of 
exclusions, the basket of goods exempted from the liberalization process is equivalent to Cote 
d’Ivoire’s imports from the European Union from 2004 to 2006. The sum of the excluded goods 
is 643, of which almost two-thirds currently face the highest tariff of 20% whereas a little over 
one third constitutes agricultural products.151  
Most of the EU liberalized items are chemical products, industrial equipment e.g. turbines, 
pumps generators, etc., and vehicles (cars, etc.). Within the excluded items of the IEPAs from 
liberalization are about 1038 products of which 32.5percent are agricultural products that are 
already within WTO requirements.152 Out of the excepted products 7.1 percent are mainly 
plastics and products within that category with 6.2 percent fish and aquatic invertebrates and 
5.8 percent consisting of edible meat offal. Other exempted products are fruits, vegetables, 
nuts which make up approximately 5.4 percent of the sum of eliminated lines in the chapter 
regarding the Harmonized System.153  
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The agreement also requires the elimination of taxes. Thus the EU, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana are 
expected not to increase already existing export duties or introduce new ones.154 There are 
however exceptions in cases that involve environment protection, infant industries,   or the 
protection of the stability of the currency value. The condition for these exceptions is giving 
prior notice to the European Community.155  
In addition, the interm economic partnership agreements include a Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) Clause. It necessitates that the contracting parties to the agreement must treat each 
other equally especially if one of them ratifies an FTA with a configuration, which is a chief 
trading economy, any non-EU state or another developed country. The clause is also a well-
balanced control of policy space, by requiring contracting partie to accord to each other any 
form of improvement in treatment.156  
Also in the IEPA for Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana is a standstill provision.157 This specifies that new 
tariffs cannot be added and removed. Likewise a tariff may not be augmented or re-instated 
once eliminated.  Hence under the IEPA Ghana is restricted from augmenting its existing tariff 
levels or adding new ones. This happens to be conflicting with the WTO requirement which 
establishes that the applied tariff is usually a lot lower than the bound rate.158 Although this 
standstill clause is clearly stipulated in article 15 of the interim EPA, there is a concession 
reformation only with regard to regional integration.  
Lastly it also consist of a rules of origin clause (article 4)  which explains that goods can be 
classified as products from both countries, thus granting them entry to markets in the EU.159 In 
the case of Ghana, the current rule of origin explains that goods that can be categorized as 
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Ghanaian-made once the inputs emanated from a state that is also a party to the interim 
EPA.160  In other words, products that are produced with inputs originating from other states in 
the ECOWAS region Like Nigeria or Benin cannot penetrate markets in the EU as goods that 
came from Ghana. This means Ghana is inhibited in developing its sector for agro-industrial 
export since it relies heavily on other countries and Asia for raw materials such as heavy metals 
and plastics.161 Nevertheless Cote d’Ivoire is the only state in the West African region that has 
fully ratified an IEPA.162 As per the above stated points on negotiations of the regional EPA 
which was formally closed by chief negotiators in February 2014, including the signed IEPAs by 
Ghana and Ivory Coast which entered into provisional application in 2016, the most important 





 3.5 Effects on regional Integration  
The EPA negotiations have all too well highlighted the gaps that exist between the economic 
reality in the region’s integration route and the political ambitions of the respective states. 
Although the ECOWAS grouping has made significant strides in deepening its amalgamation 
process in contrast to the other RECs, there are still a number of hitches in regards to attaining 
complete integration. There have equally been major setbacks with the effective execution of a 
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common market and customs union.163 In like manner, the trade liberalization structures that 
call for the free movement of goods and persons are not adhered to in all ECOWAS countries.164 
Concomitantly, the goal of attaining a common currency in the region has faced momentous 
impediments owing to the continuous deferral in establishing the second monetary zone of the 
West African region (ZMOA). With these current challenges although the EPA has been said to 
help foster integration, there have been views to the contrary that the agreement would 
obstruct the ongoing process that is already encountering unresolved issues which are 
discussed in the next text.  
  
i. Intra-Regional Trade Issue 
First and foremost it is of great importance to reiterate that; trade plays a fundamental role in 
the regional integration process in West Africa.165 Thus any arrangement which obstructs intra 
and extra-regional trade represents a barrier to trade facilitation and cooperation in the sub-
region.  In spite of all attempts geared towards the integration of the economies in the region, 
inter-regional trade in the West Africa remains sub-standard. According to a recent report by 
the WTO, intra-ECOWAS trade on the average constituted for about 11% of trade with non-
ECOWAS states.166 Likewise in the year 2000, there was only 6% of exports from Nigeria 
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(particularly oil) traded with members of the ECOWAS region (primarily Cote d’ Ivoire and 
Ghana).167  
Nonetheless, it is evident that West Africa has a market big enough for member states to 
dominate and eventually launch out to other parts of the globe as a robust competitive force.  
A fully ratified EPA has therefore been described as germane to advancing this objective. Even 
so, it is also no secret that many political and economic analysts perceive a significant amount 
of disjointedness between the stipulated EPA commitments and West Africa’s regional 
integration process.168   
One of the major effects of the EPAs is the destabilization of intra-regional trade.169 The EPA 
text lays out a list of obligations with the purpose of liberalizing the West African markets in 
favour of other states in the region and at the same time for the advantage of the EU. 
Nonetheless considering the present condition of the integration of states within the West 
African region, there is a high likelihood that the EPA would foster better conditions for EU 
products to the disadvantage of products from the ECOWAS region. In effect further 
intensifying the substandard level of physical integration and the economic inequality of 
ECOWAS economies.  
The requirement proposed by the EC text which ECOWAS states are obligates to “undertake to 
harmonize norms and measures at regional level” in Part two, Ch5, art.7. of the agreement, is 
an example.170 There is an expansive responsibility solely on the governments in the region to 
harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the various national technical regulations and 
standards; including conformity assessment procedures.171 Besides it appears the text makes 
the assumption that, the creation of an obligation is concomitant to incentivizing ECOWAS 
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governments with the necessities to achieve its integration goal. With regard to the rest of the 
text in article 7, the non-implementation of the requirement by ECOWAS governments could be 
examined in light of a dispute raised within an EPA dispute settlement procedure.172 
Additionally, in the form of an implied recognition that in the short term, the harmonization of 
regulations and standards at the regional level would be hard to attain, the EC further demands 
West African governments to adopt homogeneity of standards between themselves.173 Thus 
when there is a lack of a uniform regional directive, a product from the EU would conform to 
the requirements or regulations of only one importing state within the ECOWAS region.  When 
this occurs the EU product accepted into one of the states will have entry to the rest of the 
markets in the region without “any further restriction or administrative requirement.”  (Part II, 
Ch.5, art.7 (2)).174  
The most likely consequence of this is that, products from the EU would have a more favorable 
position in comparison to goods produced domestically. However in an effort to curtail 
sabotaging the local industries in the region, the EPA states in Part II Ch.5 art 7.(3) that, “West 
African States shall ensure that” goods from the European Union are not given more favourable 
treatment than those from the WA region itself.175 Hence West African states are obliged to 
provide smooth market access to products from the EU, harmonize their regulations and in the 
process guarantee that it doesn’t adversely affect products from the region. The most likely 
repercussion here is that, instead of regional integration being improved, the EPA has the 
potential of augmenting the region’s dependence on the European Union. A problem the 
regional integration process in essence was meant to constrain.176 The other possibility is a 
translation of this into trade diversion from ECOWAS to the advantage of the European 
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Union.177 This could further fortify the hubs and spokes effect of trade between the ECOWAS 
region and the EU.  
Moreover, as already highlighted in section 3.5 of this chapter, Cote d’Iviore and Ghana’s 
interim agreements in relation to their market access differ entirely. Hence an extension of any 
of them to the region would result to the exemption of a load of goods the coverage of which 
would exceed the amounts the EC finds acceptable. Contextually, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire 
would have to restructure their market access agreement to favor the interest of their regional 
counterparts such as Nigeria, Togo and Benin, which is likely to prompt dissatisfaction in the 
private sector.178 The EC would therefore have to adjust the EPA agreement to accommodate 
what the West African sub-region has been calling for; which is reducing its “substantially all 
trade”179 threshold proposal to considerably lower than 80% of trade liberalization.180  
 
ii. Issue of LDCs/Nigeria’s key Role in the Region 
Another concern of the effect of the EPA on integration in West Africa is its impact on least 
developed contries (LDCs) and Nigeria which as a state plays a significant role constituting up to 
60% of trade within the region.181 Foremostly, countries within the region have distinctive 
priorities and interests. This lack of homogeneity in the region can be linked to the few 
developing countries within ECOWAS and the predominance of LDCs. Nigeria for example which 
has acted as a ‘hegemon’ in the region has expressed its unwillingness to ratify the 
agreement.182 
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 In 2007 Nigeria sent an official request to the EC to permit the inclusion of non-LDC ACP states 
including itself to the general system of preference (GSP) plus scheme if the EPA agreement 
was not finalized that year. The refusal of the EC to grant this led Nigeria to refuse the signing 
of the interim agreements like Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. However due to the higher freight 
charges of the exportation of cocoa to Asian and US markets, almost 90-95% of Nigeria’s cocoa 
products are exported solely to Europe. Consequently its failure to ratify the interim EPA meant 
it facing higher tariffs by being under the standard GSP. Its cocoa liquor and cocoa butter to the 
EU currently attract 6.3% and 4.3% of trade respectively. Evaluations by COPAN (Cocoa 
Processors Association of Nigeria) indicated that it incurred losses of about $5million getting to 
the end of March 2008.  Thus due to Ghana’s signing of the provisional EPA, majority of the 
Nigerian beverage factories that use cocoa, transferred their plants to Ghana.  
 Thus the divergent nature of economies within the region became even more evident with 
Nigeria’s refusal to sign the interim EPA.  Although this decision was tantamount to it losing its 
concession from the export of cocoa, it had the ability to take such a stance since its economy 
does not thrive largely on cocoa products as much as Ghana and Ivory coast.183 Moreover, 
Nigeria has additionally made significant strides in improving its manufacturing sector as 
compared to other states in the region. Therefore it has concluded that a ratification of the EPA 
would significantly obstruct any progress it has achieved in this respect. Conflicting interests of 
such a nature, pose a big threat to the existing cooperation and integration process in the 
region.  
  
iii. Issue of the Liberalization Approach 
Another effect of the EPA on West Africa’s regional integration effort is highlighted in the 
liberalized approach towards the EU. The ECOWAS CET adopted in 2006 was to be instituted 
after a transition period of two years, with the main intent of improving the existing UEMOA 
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common external tariff (CET).184 Its inauguration would have thus corresponded with the 
commencement of the institutionalization of the EPA in January 2008. Seminally, despite the 
accelerated process, the coordination of the ECOWAS CET and that of UEMOA was deferred for 
a number of significant reasons, one being the contested proposal for the introduction of a fifth 
band customs duty.185  
This duty was brought to the table by Nigeria with the backing of non-state actors in the region. 
It proposed a 50% fifth band that was to be included to four already agreed categories for 
ECOWAS and UEMOA CET rates of 0%, 5%, 10% and 20%. The region even so, finally agreed on 
the concept of a fifth band of 35%.186 Thus, in light of this, an important area for consideration 
was the starting point for opening up the market for the EU. Basically the principal question 
was whether it would be the 35% fifth band suggested for the ECOWAS CET or the 20% 
maximum fourth band which has been implemented by UEMOA.  This contention is expected to 
create certain issues for liberalization with the EPA framework at the regional level.187  
Penultimately, certain countries within the region might at the outset have to raise their tariffs 
to the level of the fifth band towards the EU before undoing them.188 Under this circumstance, 
the fifth band predominantly affects goods manufactured in Nigeria. Also it is important to note 
that the increase in tariffs is further likely to repudiate or complicate the standstill clause in the 
provisional EPAs of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.189 Likewise the time allocated for the liberalization 
periods are expected to be cumbersome as Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire under their provisional 
EPAs have had their markets opened since 2009. They potentially have to re-introduce tariffs on 
imports from the EU to allow the replacement of the new liberalization schemes for the 
complete regional EPA. The implications here are that, in the process there is a high likelihood 
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of such states being compelled to exceed their MFN (Most Favored Nation) commitments at 





iv. Issue of conflicting interests 
Also, within the West African region there is a sense of ideological and political divide between 
the anglophone region and francophone region (UEMOA) which is additionally exacerbated by 
the EPA due to their different levels of integration.191 This ongoing divergence has led to 
competition for regional hegemony and is clearly mirrored in some of the hindrances to the 
regional integration process already being experienced in the region. Despite the momentous 
attempts by UMEOA and ECOWAS to bridge the integration gap through the harmonization of 
integration programmes, the EPA agreement fails to factor in and recognize these core issues 
counteracting the integration process in ECOWAS.192  
Moreover within the region exists anglophone, francophone and lusophone countries including 
countries experiencing internal tumult and others that are recovering from armed conflict (Cote 
d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia).193 Hence these states prioritize maintaining peace and 
rebuilding their economies rather than matters on a regional level. Some even lack the national 
institutions that would facilitate substantial observation of the negotiations. As a result of the 
EPA’s failure to factor in these ‘minor’ yet important issues, the region is experiencing major 
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v. Issue of Government Revenue 
It is undisputed that an ultimate objective of regional integration is the long-term economic 
development of member states. Given the high dependence of developing states on fiscal 
revenue, regional integration is not relevant if it cannot champion such a goal. Moreover, there 
are persisting fears that the EPA will cause notable damage for a large percentage of West 
African states for which trade revenues make up a relevant fraction of aggregate income.195 In 
the West African region as a whole, in 1996, there was an increase of import tariff revenue 
from an annual average of 2.4 from US$2.8 billion to US$3.0 billion in 1999.196 Moreover, a 
number of states documented adverse growth in import tariff revenue stemming from an 
amalgam of issues as well as cumulative import liberalization standards in those states. These 
states comprise of Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone. Figures 4 & 5 
depict the patterns in export and import tariff revenues for the states in the ECOWAS region 
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Figure 4: Pattern In Export Tariffs between 1996-2000 (in millions of dollars) 
Countries/ 
Years  
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Grw rate 
1996-1999 
(%) 
Benin 0.68 0.45 0.20 0.08 - -49.79 
Burkina Faso 1.17 1.20 1.70 0.97 1.40 0.43 
Cote d’Ivoire 402.10 296.98 267.82 287.15 229.50 -9.58 
Gambia  - - - - -  
Ghana  170.97 133.77 176.73 173.52 153.17 2.85 
Guinea 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.65 0.00 
Liberia  - - - - -  
Mali  - - - - -  
Niger  0.73 2.36 3.34 5.86 - 113.42 
Nigeria - - - - -  
Senegal 24.04 27.59 27.12 25.99 93.12 2.97 
Sierra Leone 0.37 0.63 11.84 5.87 8.78 599.74 
Togo - - - - -  
Total  600.19 463.11 488.88 499.57 486.62 -5.03 
Source: ECOWAS (2003) Statistical Bulletin  
Figure 5: Pattern In Export Tariffs between 1996-2000 (in millions of dollars) 
Countries/Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Grw rate 
1996- 
1999(%) 
Benin 125.61 124.12 133.99 150.05  6.25 
Burkina Faso 128.04 124.70 118.48 120.84 76.55 -1.87 
Cote d’Ivoire 747.70 700.55 705.82 664.12 451.42 -3.82 
Gambia 28.78 28.88 36.83 - - 13.94 
Ghana 230.86 240.01 302.46 298.26 215.60 9.53 
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Guinea 135.73 164.63 163.56 149.33 145.91 3.98 
Liberia 48.36 61.90 18.00 19.50 NA -11.53 
Mali 184.67 192.88 207.48 222.19 NA 6.37 
Niger 50.70 56.53 69.51 69.13 NA 11.30 
Nigeria 675.02 771.60 686.70 952.40 998.27 14.00 
Senegal  348.53 310.18 318.67 295.76 245.93 -5.15 
Sierra Leon  44.01 52.99 25.06 18.44 33.33 -19.57 
Togo 49.26 50.90 49.83 43.04 NA -4.13 
Total 2797.27 2879.87 2836.39 3003.06 2167.01 2.44 
 Source: ECOWAS (2003) Statistical Bulletin 
Export tariffs for most of the states in the region have been considerably rolled back or 
removed. Nigeria for example has removed export tariffs on all imports. Equally, export tariffs 
revenues in Benin waned by an annual average of almost 50% between 1996 and 1999 from 
$0.68 million to $0.08 million.198 Nonetheless, export tariffs for a few states remain a 
substantial source of revenue, for example, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.  
A likely consequence of EPA provisions in this instance is the duty free entry of imports from 
the EU to the markets of ECOWAS states. However almost all these states have the EU as the 
sole principal trading bloc.199 The share of the EU in the total imports for each state in the 
region differs from a maximum of 74% for Cape Verde to a minimum of roughly 29% for Niger 
and for the entire ECOWAS region 49.3% in 2001.200 Thus the liberalization of trade between 
the EU and ECOWAS, modelled on the EPA will potentially hinder the administration of fiscal 
functions and affect the capacity of governments in the region to create revenue.  
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Moreover it is noteworthy that ECOWAS states are already operating at enormous at fiscal loss 
and with the exception of Cote d’Ivoire, all states in the region had fiscal losses in 2001.201 This 
therefore illustrates that; the loss of revenue from import liberalization could further aggravate 
the uncertain fiscal levels of the different states. Such a consequence undermines the core 
essence of integration in the region, as states would continue to exacerbate the issue of 






 The EPA undisputedly put immense pressure on ECOWAS to facilitate political decisions 
pertaining to integration strategies that had long been taken but were yet to be 
implemented.202  For example, the EPA liberalization steps towards the EU helped expedite the 
regional preference clause in article 103, which compels member states to accord to all regional 
counterparts any liberalization schemes.203  Although remarked as a positive effect of the EPA 
on regional integration, it has been argued that it ultimately does not prevent imports from the 
EU displacing imports from the West African sub-region.  
  The configuration of the economies in the ECOWAS region is clearly distinct from that of the 
EU. Therefore the reciprocal feature embedded in this trade agreement will undoubtedly have 
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effects on the regional integration processes in the region.204  Whereas it is rational for the EU 
to take advantage of power asymmetries in their dealings with ECOWAS states, the indication 
of the effects of the EPA appear to have a more advantageous slant in favor of the EU than for 
the ECOWAS region at large. Issues such as, low intra-regional trade, conflicting interests, 
ineffective liberalization approach, the dominant role of LDCs, Nigeria’s reservations and low 
government revenue, highlight the extent to which the EPA as an effect on ECOWAS’ regional 
integration agenda.205 Members of the ECOWAS community have well established in the 
ECOWAS preamble, as being convinced that the;  
“Promotion of harmonious economic development of states calls for effective economic co-
operation and integration largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-
reliance.″206 
Thus the EPAs’ goal to promote regional integration in the region cannot be achieved unless its 
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Since its inception in 1980 as SADCC (South African Development Coordination Conference), the 
Southern African region has been steered by the principal aim to create a regional bloc for the 
enhancement of the sub-region’s economic performance, the connection of regional 
economies, and improvement of the region’s political stability.207  Although the SADCC was 
originally formed to alleviate economic reliance in the then apartheid South Africa, it also 
aspired to create economic partnerships for the forging of equitable regional integration 
schemes, by marshalling resources to advance regional and interstate policies.208  Thus, 
consequent to the emancipation of most states in the region, the establishment of SADC in 
1992, was perceived as a furtherance of endeavors to fortify economic independence within 
Southern Africa.209  
SADC as a regional organization consists of 14 African states, which subsequent to the signing of 
the CPA (Cotonou Partnership Agreement) in June 2000, were authorized to enter into the EPA 
with the EU.210  Just like ECOWAS, the EU is SADC’s leading trade partner, while South Africa 
accounts for the greatest share of EU imports and exports from the region.211  However it is 
remarkable that, South Africa was one of the states in the sub-region that expressed the most 
concern about several provisions in the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPAs). 
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Nonetheless after frequently articulating its misgivings, SADC eventually signed its Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the EU on 10 June 2016.  
Membership, in the SADC often overlaps with other regional arrangements that have diverse 
and even sometimes conflicting trade and integration programmes.212 Yet such members were 
also expected to negotiate EPAs with the EU. As a result, the SADC grouping comprised of 
Mozambique, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, and Botswana, leaving the other six members 
(Malawi, Congo, Mauritius, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Zambia) that are negotiating EPAs with 
the EU under other regional groups i.e. Eastern and Southern Africa/Central Africa.213 Although 
Angola opted out, it on the other hand has the opportunity become a part of the agreement in 
the future.  
 
4.1 Negotiations 
The official launching of the SADC and EU EPA negotiations was on 8th July 2004, in Windhoek, 
Namibia. Amongst the 15 members of the South African Development Community, 7 states 
decided to engage in EPA talks with the EC.  This led to the creation of SADC-EC EPA group 
comprised of, Botswana, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Lesotho, Tanzania and Swaziland. 
South Africa on the other hand began its participation from a supporter and observer status 
and later joined officially as a negotiator and substantive member in 2007.  
The EPA between the SADC and the EC was centered on the regional integration strategies of 
the SADC states. The talks were arranged in a manner to support and complement the 
integration process and programmes as well as, the consolidation of the regional market and 
the harmonization of SADC obligations.  The Botswana Minister of Trade and Industry was 
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appointed to direct the talks for the region at the Ministerial level.214 A principal negotiator was 
also designated to lead the negotiations at the Senior Official Level, while the EPA unit of the 
SADC secretariat was appointed to lead at the technical level.215  
In respect to the European Union, negotiations were led by the European Commission with the 
representation of the Commissioner for Trade at the ministerial level. At the senior level, talks 
were led by a senior official of the Directorate General for Trade, while the technical level was 
handled by the Directorate General Trade Unit in charge of the SADC-EC EPA coordination.216  
 
4.2 Structure of Negotiations 
In March 2006, the SADC EPA group presented its recommended agenda for the negotiations to 
the EU at a meeting of the EC and SADC senior officials. The significant feature of SADC’s EPA 
proposal was the amendment of the already established Trade and Development Cooperation 
Agreement (TDCA) between South Africa and the EU.217  This proposal mandated the EC to 
request a revised negotiating order from the member states of the EU. The process was quite 
lengthy and the EC was only able to report back to SADC in a meeting held in March 2007.218 It 
therefore marked the first meeting between the SADC group with the inclusion of South Africa 
and the EC.  
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At this meeting, a roadmap was approved with the purpose of finalizing talks by the end of the 
year. Similarly, it registered the adjustment of the intent of the negotiations towards 
development issues, trade in goods, investment and trade in services, further placing emphasis 
on the institution of common regional policies. The meeting was further used by the SADC 
group to pressure the EC for the insertion of a chapter on development in the SADC-EPA.  
Unfortunately, in the months following the March 2007 meeting, disputes erupted between 
members in the SADC group. The tensions were over the concerns of Namibia, Botswana, 
Swaziland and Lesotho (BLNS) over SACU’s market access proposal which was predominantly 
based on the TDCA (The Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement).219 It is important to 
highlight that the TDCA is a trade agreement between the European Community and South 
Africa. In addition its peculiarity was what provoked tensions between certain members of the 
SADC-EPA as the agreement did not contain any provisions for the accession of the BLNS 
states.220     
Issues also arose within the group over the introduction of trade in service obligations in the 
EPA. A significant number of the SADC-EPA group members were of the view that, it would be 
more beneficial to partner with the EU on novel generation trade subjects instead of 
committing to any obligatory agreements outside those pertaining to trade in services. South 
Africa on the other hand objected to the inclusion of trade in services out rightly.221 With all 
these tensions, Lesotho, Namibia, Botswana, and Swaziland initialled interim EPAs with the EU. 
It was signed against the backdrop that unsettled concerns would be re-visited for discussion in 
2008.  Besides, it happened to be the sole factor that convinced Namibia to agree to an IEPA. 
An official statement was made outlining the problems to be addressed preceding the signed 
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initialled interim agreement.222 The IEPA was not initialed by Angola since it abstained from 
presenting a market access proposal to the EC, while South Africa on the other hand refused to 
sign the interim agreement on grounds of reservations about key provisions in the IEPA text.223  
 
4.3 Interim Agreements  
Countries that initialed the IEPA were guaranteed quota free and duty free access to the EU 
market. At the same time, member states like Angola maintained their reception of EBA 
(Everything But Arms) preferences, whereas South Africa continued to engage in trade with the 
EU under the TDCA.224 The key features of the IEPA were a commitment to pursue negotiations 
towards a complete EPA in 2008, a single goods market deal between the initialing SADC states, 
and the EU’s inclusion of a chapter on development cooperation.  
The SADC IEPA was initialled in 2009 by Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and 
Namibia. The aims of the IEPA consist of the promotion of regional integration amongst the 
SADC-EPA group, and their ultimate integration into the international market, in accordance 
with their development priorities and political choices, taking into consideration the eradication 
of poverty through trade cooperation.225 The state parties to the agreement are to ensure they 
execute their activities with the intention of attaining sustainable development in the region. 
The IEPA text further enhances economic and commercial relations between the contracting 
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parties in accordance with WTO requirements while facilitating the enforcement of the SADC 
Trade Protocol.226  
Concurrently, it promotes the liberalization process between the SADC-EPA countries and the 
EU. At the core of the IEPA is the recognition of the importance of regional integration, thus its 
intent is to give support and ensure that the content and pace of regional integration in the 
region is influenced by the SADC-EPA countries’ utilization of their sovereignty.227 The principle 
behind this trade partnership is the development of trade in goods between the IEPA 
contracting parties by proper implementation of rules of origin, by establishing trade 
liberalization and ultimately enhancing the capacity of the SADC-EPA states to trade on a global 
platform.228  
According to the IEPA text, article 19 focuses on the establishment of an FTA between the 
contracting parties.229 It takes into consideration the standard of asymmetry in the 
enforcement of trade liberalization requirements by the parties involved. This simply means 
that the schedules for tariff liberalization would differ based on the development status of the 
states in question. The standstill clause also highlighted in article 23 deals with import and 
export tariffs.230 Here the goods the IEPA parties traded between themselves at the time the 
agreement came into force is not to be altered at a later stage. This provision was a key area of 
contention during the negotiations.231  
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 The agreement further provides that products from the EU would be subjected to the 
respective tariff schedules of the IEPA SADC members. EU imports on entry into SADC shall not 
be subject to extra taxation. Also in cases where these goods are re-exported from the SADC 
EPA region, all tax claimed will be reimbursed, since such would have been subject to import 
duty in the importing state. Likewise, parties are to collaborate in trade and customs 
facilitation, with the goal of guaranteeing the enforcement of the agreement.  
The SADC contracting parties will have a transition time of 5 years to bring the trade and 
customs facilitation measures in alignment with their commitments under the interim EPA.232 
The customs harmonization measures at the regional level would be supported, however the 
process involved would be determined unilaterally. The goal of this obligation is to enable 
SADC-EPA states have the choice of liberalization of their markets at either a national or 
regional level. Based on the IEPA, the EU would liberalize 100 percent of tariffs on goods from 
the SADC-EPA states, with transitional time frames for tariffs on rice and sugar.233  Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland were to liberalize 86% of tariffs on products, including 44 tariff 
lines pertaining to sensitive goods by 2015, with three extra tariff lines projected to be 
liberalized by the end of 2018. These agreed schedules for liberalization are also very similar to 
the schedules stipulated under the Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation 
between the EU and South Africa.234  
The Rules of Origin clause in the agreement also dealt with products viable for preferential 
market access depending on whether they originated from the SADCEPA state or the EU.235 
Negotiations surrounding this area had to be discussed at length in order to reach a simplified 
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and workable system. This proved to be quite complex since the SADC EPA group constitutes 
states that form part of more than one regional grouping with diverse rules of origin clause.   
Finally pertaining to goods exempted, tariffs on agricultural products were maintained including 
those already manufactured. The goods consisted of beef, fish, vegetables, fruits, nuts, coffee, 
sugar and cut flowers. These measures were taken to ensure the protection of local industries 
in the region.236  
 
4.4 Issues raised 
It is no secret that over-lapping membership has been a major challenge in the regional 
integration process in Africa. Hence the issue of multi-membership was highlighted during the 
SADC-EPA negotiations.237 During the negotiations, it was observed that all the 7 SADC 
countries belonged to a minimum of two regional blocs.  For example, South Africa, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Botswana belong to SACU; Tanzania belongs to the EAC but not SACU or COMESA; 
Angola belongs to COMESA but not SACU; Swaziland to SACU, SADC and COMESA; Mozambique 
to SADC but not COMESA and SACU.238 Hence the concern was that the overlapping 
commitments would likely create tensions that would stultify the negotiations.  
Moreover, another concern was the positioning of the TDCA.  Although the initiative was met 
with great optimism, the members of SACU that constituted the SADC-EPA group were also de-
facto members of the EU and South Africa TDCA agreement. Naturally, they raised the issue 
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that the TDCA would be detrimental to their economies by exposing them to the competitive 
EU market which significantly subsidizes its producers from the agricultural sector. 
Another key issue that arose was with the meaning of the development feature in the EPA 
agreement.239 The interpretation of development by the EU throughout the talks was complete 
liberalization of the market including the incorporation of Singapore Issues (trade facilitation, 
investment, government, competition and procurement).240 However in a proposal submitted 
to the EU in 2006, regarding a strategic framework for the SADC-EPA, trade ministers suggested 
inter alia the elimination of the Singapore issues from the negotiations as they did not 
constitute WTO obligations.   
Furthermore the presence of LDCs within the group was an issue. They raised a concern that 
states like Mozambique, Tanzania, Lesotho and Angola granted non-reciprocity in the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, may encounter issues by ratifying the EPAs as the 
negotiations would be overly extended to provide for their unique situation.241 The key element 
supporting these reservations stemmed from the reciprocal trade liberalization clause 
enshrined in the EPA agreement; that canceled out the privileges under the EBA. Another 
quandary was that even in the attempt to reject the EPA to maintain the EBA; the 
developmental and other assistance which the EPA package provided for would be lost.242  
Lastly, another major concern was with the interpretation of article XXIV of the GATT. 
According to WTO law, all ACP states forming FTAs with the EU would have to significantly 
liberalize all their trade with the EU in an equitable amount of time. The EU interpreted this 
clause with the EPA negotiations as ACP countries having the obligation to liberalize 80 percent 
of their markets to goods from the EU within ten years; and likelihood prolongation of 20 to 25 
years for products labelled as sensitive.243 Among the ACP countries it was mainly the SADC-
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EPA group that articulated that this magnitude of liberalization could negatively affect current 
and future local industries, government revenue and rural livelihoods. These expressed 
concerns further incited private sector organizations, a number of key stakeholders and civil 
society to raise a campaign against the signing of the EPAs.244  Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that the stalemate of the DOHA rounds exacerbated the article XXIV of the GATT issue.245 This is 
because members of the WTO, primarily African states anticipated the interpretations of article 





4.5 Effects on regional integration  
It is essential to restate that unlike ECOWAS, the SADC member states failed to negotiate EPAs 
as a complete regional bloc.246 Thus during the launch of EPA negotiations, a series of concerns 
were raised regarding its influence on the regional integration process in the region. Although it 
was established that the agreement would help foster and strengthen integration, it has 
appeared to rather disintegrate the regional integration process in SADC. Most members of the 
SADC region negotiated EPAs under the ESA grouping.247 For example the DRC negotiated 
under the Central African EPA group while Mauritius joined the Indian Ocean EPA group, and 




244 Aileen Kwa, Peter Lunenborg, Wase Musonge, “African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries' position on 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)″ (Belgium:Europea Union, 2014)  
245 Makombe, P. F., ‘Economic Partnership Agreement and SADC: the controversy continues’, Economic Justice 
Network, Accessed November 18, 2016  http://www.ejn.org.za/index.php/ejn-on-the-move/ejn-on-the-move-
views/445-economic-partners  
246 Can SADC-EU Trade Negotiations Unblock Development And Regional Integration?, Institute for Social and 





Tanzania the EAC configuration. These divisions will be stumbling blocks to SADC’s principal 
goal of establishing a customs union. In addition, SADC would also have to deal with issues such 
as a weak strategy for deeper integration, problems pertaining to the enforcement of agreed 
protocols, and dissimilar policies regarding services and trade related matters.248  
Furthermore the EPA has had an effect on the credibility of SACU as a customs union.249 Within 
the SACU region, Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho initialled the IEPA without any reservation. 
However Namibia on the other hand initialled with objections, while South Africa avoided 
initialing the agreement entirely. According to article 31 (3) of the SACU agreement, there must 
be an approval from all members before a PTA (Preferential Trade Agreement) with third 
parties before an agreement of this nature is concluded.250  
This was however not the case with the initialing of IEPAs in the region. This evidently further 
highlights the fragmentation of the integration process in the sub-region. It is also in 
contravention of article 35(2) of the Cotonou Agreement which states that, 
“Economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP 
states bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of 
the ACP countries into the world economy.”251  
Likewise there are several differences in the IEPA liberalization schedules consented to by SADC 
states that are part of the SADC-EPA group and the ESA-EPA group.252 Taking into consideration 
the goods marked for exclusion by the ESA, none of them falls into the category of goods in the 
exclusion basket of states that concluded the SADC IEPAs. The disparities in liberalization 
schedules will have an adverse effect on regional integration in the SADC region.  
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Also the rules of origin clause, within the SADC IEPA is different from what is applicable to 
SADC.253 The rules of origin pertaining to SADC allows that, goods which originate from the 
region gain duty free market access to a market of a SADC member state. In contrast, goods 
under the SADC IEPA that require duty free access are only those that come from the EU and 
SADC IEPA states. Once the common external tariff is formed, its implementation on imports 
from the EU by states not party to the SADC EPA, will likely clash with the tariffs applicable 
under the EPA; the reason being that products from the EU would have already gained duty 
free access to the markets of the SADC EPA states. Furthermore the EPA is likely to exacerbate 
the lack of economic diversification in the region; an issue that was raised during the 
negotiations.254 The following paragraphs look in depth at some of the main effects the EPA will 
have on regional integration in SADC.  
 
i. Undermining existing regional structures 
Right from the inception of discussions on EPAs, the spaghetti bowl phenomenon existing in the 
SADC region was further aggravated due to the lack of consideration of the already established 
organizations by member states. It can thus be presumed that majority of member states, tilted 
towards their national interest at the expense of the key goal to advance the regional plan, 
during its selection of negotiating partners.255 Since one of the primary pillars of the EPA is to 
support the advancement of already established regional agendas, the current situation in the 
SADC shows otherwise.  
For example the IEPA text initialled by Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland refers to 
these four states as SADC-EPA, a regional organization that is non-existent with a non-
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legitimate status.256 It is further unclear the extent to which the commitments under the SADC-
EPA correlate or correspond with those under SADC and SACU. This highlights the subversion of 
the key established regional structures in the region.  
 
 
ii. The disintegration of SADC and SACU  
The disintegration of the SADC region was evident from the commencement of EPA 
negotiations. SACU for example was splintered into two factions with the BLS states on one 
hand and Namibia and South Africa on the other.257 This was due to the reservations of both 
states (Namibia and South Africa) with initialling of the IEPAs. Nonetheless although the SADC-
EPA was signed by all five states on 10 June 2016, one can envisage the implications of the BLNS 
being separated from South Africa that contributes roughly 95% of SACU’s GDP.258  
Furthermore before South Africa decided to sign the SADC-EPA, there was difficulty in  
attempts made to harmonize a trade relationship between the BLNS, South Africa and the EU. 
Thus up until June 2016 the relationship between South Africa and BNLS states with the EU 
were under two different trade arrangements.259  As a result of the prolonged uncertainty 
between the BLNS states and the EU prior to South Africa’s signing of the SADC EPA, two 
separate agreements were suggested as being pertinent to ensure more stringent 
implementation of rules of origin and border control.  
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This proposed measure informed by the necessity of applying different trade requirements of 
the TDCA instead of a SADC EPA altogether.  This would have been a clear aspersion to the 
regional integration agenda. Thus one key question would have been whether the TDCA trade 
relationship is in contravention of article 31 of the SACU agreement. It establishes that member 
states are permitted to “maintain preferential trade and other related arrangements existing at 
the time of entry into force of the agreement.”260 The concern with this provision is that it 
entrusts SACU member states with an absolute right to foster and maintain standing 
preferential trade agreements. This means that there are unlimited possibilities for the 
members of the customs union to place zero restrictions to manage, the compatibility of 
different trade relations entered into such as the TDCA.261 Hence there are several avenues that 
allow member states to be party to trade agreements that are conflicting.  
Moreover, not only is the likelihood of having a member of a customs union being unilaterally 
part of an FTA alarming,  but the several commitments to different organizations places an 
unavoidable effect on the CET.262 It also undermines the credibility of SACU as a customs union 
entirely. This leaves a consequence of dissimilar Rules of Origin that are highly problematic. 
Although the SADC-EPA has been signed by all five states it still awaits ratification. In the event 
of a fragmentation between South Africa and the BLNS, the issue rests on whether SACU would 
be able to survive any form of disintegration and whether the definition of a customs union in 
chapter 2 of the SACU agreement, would be upheld by the organization.263 This is because, the 
SACU agreement mandates that no tariffs are adopted between member states thus, 
reinforcing the necessity of a common external tariff.  
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It is also evident in article 32 of the SACU agreement that members are required to obtain 
permission before partaking in trade arrangements with third parties.264 In this circumstance 
South Africa could have prevented the BLNS states from negotiating towards a complete EPA. 
This would have led to the entire fragmentation of SACU. It would have further undermined the 
organization’s role as a tool for advancing deeper integration in the SADC region, regarding the 
enforcement of variable geometry. Moreover if the fragmentation of SACU were to occur, it 
would be highly detrimental not only to the region but to the continent at large, as it represents 
one of the only two monetary integration structures in Africa.  
Besides, the SADC configuration instituted four different negotiating groups in respect of the 
European Union i.e. the TDCA, SADC-EPA, EAC-EPA and the EBA. It is also important to note that 
each group had its unique tariff schedules. What is rather unsettling is, instead of the SADC-EPA 
incorporating all member states of the organization, it excludes Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
and Malawi which were founders of SADC.265 This has the potential of jeopardizing all SADC’s 
objectives to establish a customs union. However for the union to be effective, all member 
states must have equal trade obligations.266 This aids effective administration and escapes the 
incidence of conflicting grouping that causes incompatible trade commitments.267 Hence states 
attempting to institute a customs union must endeavor to be part of the same EPA group. 
 
iii. Divisions between LDCs and non-LDCs  
The SADC region consists of four non-least developed countries and three least developed 
countries. However this categorization of states into least developed and developed has 
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somewhat intensified the disintegration of the SADC region.268 It was highlighted that LDC’s are 
limited in relation to the ability to provide incentives for the EPA process from a trade stand 
point. This is mainly because they will barely attain extra access to the EU market in exchange 
for opening theirs. Conversely, an agreement like the EBA is perceived as be more beneficial for 
LDCs especially due to provisions that have far less rigorous rules of origin.  
Notwithstanding this, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland opted to negotiate under the EPA 
forgoing the concessions they are entitled to under the EBA (Everything But Arms) scheme.269 
This decision was taken since the EPA appears to provide more stability. Moreover, although 
development finance has not been the condition for initialling the EPA, the concern of enduring 
certain consequences for failing to be party to the EU-favoured agreement could have also 
influenced the LDCs.270  
With that said, it is likewise clear that Swaziland and Lesotho still have the option to resort to 
the EBA if they decide to pull out of the EPA. If this were to occur, it would adversely affect 
SACU by splintering into to three different configurations. Namibia on the other hand, is not 
considered a least developed state.271 There has however been much controversy around this 
classification as it implies that as a state it does not have access to the EBA and would be 
relegated to the conditions of a less advantageous standard- namely the GSP.272 Nonetheless, 
although Namibia initialed the IEPA with misgivings, which caused significant doubt about the 
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future of the SADC region, its signing of the full EPA in June 2016 raised hope that the legal 
ambit of the SADC-EPA would be addressed. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that aspiration for 
deeper integration in the sub-region is at risk.  
 
iv. Reciprocity 
This has been one of the major areas of contention in regards to the effect of the EPA on 
regional integration in Africa.273 Development, which has been a core purpose of integration in 
the various sub-regions, appears to be at the core of the question of reciprocity. In analyzing 
the impact of reciprocity, it is imperative to first consider the several debates, and litany of 
theories that have challenged the effectiveness of instituting liberalization schemes as elements 
of economic strategies. Interestingly, these discussions have seethed since SAP’s (Structural 
Adjustment Programs) calling for the liberalization of economies was popularized in the 
1990’s.274  
In light of this, it can be gathered that, as no state has achieved development by shunning 
international trade, not a single one has also developed by merely liberalizing trade. Hence it is 
excessively simplistic to conclude that reciprocity as a component of trade liberalization will 
organically lead to increased economic growth and trade. This is a concern that has been 
brought to the attention of the EU by the SADC-EPA members.  Reciprocity is likely to have two 
different implications on the SADC region which can be described as direct and indirect.275 The 
direct implication consists of a negative effect on government revenue especially for states like 
Swaziland and Lesotho while exposing the local industries of member states are exposed to 
highly competitive producers within the European economy.276 On the other hand, the indirect 
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implication would be reflected in the possible jeopardy of the region’s endeavors to alleviate 
poverty, unemployment and to facilitate growth.   
Concerns about the impacts of the reciprocity clause in the SADC-EPAs have not only been 
expressed by member states, but also by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) which has made reference to the fact that, “the benefits that SADC region expects are 
not guaranteed to be substantial enough to weigh the potential costs.”277 Another argument 
raised is that reciprocity must not be capriciously associated to figures, the interpretation of 
WTO commitments or even time frames. However its determination should factor in 
development and financial needs, levels of trade as it is stipulated, in accordance with the norm 
of distinction in the Cotonou Agreement.  Additionally the principle that ″African regions should 
be allowed to pursue their regional integration processes at a pace that is commensurate with 
their political, economic and social capacities”278 outlined in the Nairobi Declaration reinforces 
this point. According to many critics, reciprocity must be considered prudently and so must all 
procedures that call for the prioritization of trade relations with the EU over the advancement 
of the regional integration agenda.279 More so it is at the point where regional integration has 
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v. The Singaporean Issues  
The European Union’s plans for the SADC-EPAs also seek to incorporate agreements on 
competition policy, government procurement and investments.280 This is also termed as the 
Singaporean issues, ‘new generation issues’ or ‘WTO-plus’ since they exceed the terms of the 
general WTO requirements.281 Moreover they are not covered in the Cotonou Agreement but 
are included in the EPAs as an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive plan for the ACP 
states.282  
The EU has been an ardent supporter of three of the four Singaporean issues, namely- 
competition, investment and transparency in government procurement.283 It is interesting to 
however to note that, these were dropped from the Doha work program due to persistent 
disapproval from developing nations alongside ACP states. Nevertheless these issues were 
adopted into the SADC-EPA agreement.284 This means the states in this grouping had to 
recontest a battle they had already won in the WTO but this time from less advantageous 
position.  
In an assessment of the Singaporean issues, their effects on SADC are detrimental to the 
regional integration process in a series of aspects. It is clear that the SADC region is yet to reach 
cohesive degrees of integration. As previously established, entering trade negotiations with 
third parties before solidifying coherence will produce substandard benefits from the 
negotiation process in these areas. There might be future dissections between members in the 
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SADC region who consent to the adoption of a pre-negotiated set of regulations and those 
against it. In the field of competition law and policy for example, developing states are warned 
against the enticement of mimicking competition prototypes from developed nations.285 
Usually, the set laws and policies are to be tailored towards the particular needs of a specific 
area. Therefore, for a state to already have existing obligations in such an area can prove to be 
very incapacitating. 
Moreover, these Singaporean issues have been highlighted as one of the major concerns which 
stopped Namibia and South Africa from initialing the IEPAs.286 In addition it is uncertain 
whether Mozambique and the BLS states have the required financial support and capacity to 
establish the legal and institutional modifications that will be necessary to execute the diverse 
regulations and rules. In light of this, it can be noted that the main concern and reservations 
directed towards the insertion of the Singaporean issues into the EPA, is that, it stands to 
hamper the progress and stride of the regional integration process.287 Despite the fact that 
these Singaporean issues have been withdrawn from the multilateral negotiating desk, they 
have found a subtle way to re-emerge in the regional trade agreement; a place where most 
developing states have weak bargaining power to reject them. 288 
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4.6 Conclusion  
Within Sub-Saharan Africa, the Economic Partnership Agreements have been discussed outside 
the already established regional organizations. SADC especially has been unsuccessful in 
harmonizing relations between the TDCA and BNLS states. Coupled with this, the EPAs have  
aggravated ruptures between SACU & SADC, non-LDC countries and LDC countries. It is thus 
evident that there will be consequences with regard to integration in the region.  
Nevertheless, one cannot associate all existing issues with regional integration in the region to 
the EPAs.289 As mentioned previously the continent has already been dealing with a series of 
problems in this regard. However the EPAs have to a significant extent, reinforced the 
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Comparative Analysis of ECOWAS and SADC EPA 
 
Introduction 
 ECOWAS was the first region in Africa to endorse a regional EPA on 10th July 2014. The SADC-
EPA group after 12 years of deliberations with the EU on trade in goods, also finally initialled 
the agreement on 15th July 2014. Markedly, although these agreements are ample to establish 
the entrée of vital products to the EU market; talks are nonetheless still ongoing regarding 
investments, other trade related issues, and services to secure a complete outline that is 
anticipated to oversee trade relations between the EU and ACP regions.290 Nevertheless it is 
also important to note that there is no set deadline for a conclusion on the pivotal areas 
pertaining to these discussions. 
The period in which ECOWAS and SADC concluded their EPAs is very significant. It forestalled 
the deadline of 1st October after  which all non-LDC states in the two groups i.e. Ivory Coast and 
Ghana for ECOWAS and Namibia, Swaziland and Botswana for the SADC group; would have if 
not, lost their quota and duty free preferences for their key exports to the EU.291  Thereby 
compelling them to revert back to the GPS (Generalized System of Preference) or incur a loss of 
all preferences, like in the case of Botswana after 2016 when the provisional time frame 
assigned to upper middle income states terminates. Thus it underscored the necessity for ACP 
states to conclude EPAs at the regional level.  
                                                          
290 Isabelle Ramado et al., “ECOWAS and SADC Economic Partnership Agreements: A Comparative Analysis″  
European Centre for Development Policy Management, no. 165 (2014): 2, http://ecdpm.org/publications/ecowas-
sadc-economic-partnership-agreement-comparative-analysis/  
291 Ibid,. 3 
89 
 
Moreover there is also political relevance to the completion of EPAs at a regional level.  African 
policy makers for example are guaranteed consistency with their individual regional integration 
process including the most significant assurance of securing the unison of the various regional 
blocs. Had this not been the case, if certain states like Ivory Coast in ECOWAS and Botswana, 
Swaziland, etc. in SADC, had no other option but to conclude unilateral EPAs in order to 
maintain trade benefits with the EU, it would have posed a major risk to the integration process 
in the two regions.292 Besides if the EPAs were not concluded on a regional level, it would have 
been arduous to legitimize the EPAs stipulated objective of facilitating regional integration as it 
would have led to the fragmentation of regional blocs.  
Albeit the discussion of EPAs in regional groups, it is relevant to note that ECOWAS and the East 
African Community were the only regions that covered full membership.293 Thus they were the 
only regional economic communities that could negotiate as a bloc and on the basis of the 
already existing regional integration plan. In regards to the other groups, due to overlapping of 
membership in the various RECs including the absence of the full commitment of certain 
members; they were only able to embody sub-groups of their individual arrangements. This 
highlights the major consequences of the EPAs on the future of the regional integration agenda 
Africa.  
To further understand this implication, it is necessary to assess comparatively the main 
provisions of the SADC and ECOWAS EPAs. These important provisions will be summarized in 
the context of coverage, development and policy space which will serve as a buttress in 
analyzing the impact it will generally have on regional integration in the Africa.    
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5.1 Product Coverage  
As a region and founded on its common external tariff, ECOWAS is due to liberalize 75% of its 
tariff lines, over a time frame of 20 years. Liberalization is meant to be steady and products are 
ordered in four separate categories namely category A, B, C, D. Category A consists of capital 
goods, basic commodities, essential social goods and specific inputs.294 Category B consists of 
inputs and intermediate products. Category C is made up of final products and D is sensitive 
products. The goods under category D are classified as sensitive products are in the list of 
excluded products found in ECOWAS-EPA agreement.  
It covers a wide variety of products that range from industrial goods, agricultural goods and 
even the areas in ECOWAS states where projects are being developed. These consist of inter 
alia, fish products, fish, meat products, meat, cocoa, textiles and cement.295 The range of goods 
in the exclusion list was subject to prolonged and intense deliberation by members of the 
ECOWAS community particularly in the late stages of discussions due to the several concerns of 
Nigeria. It was of particular interest to Nigeria, due to the immense growth of industrialization 
currently taking place in the country. Especially, the private sector, which is investing heavily in 
agro processing to provide support to the local industries. Moreover equal investments are also 
taking place in other industrial sectors of the country e.g. textile and cement sector including 
light manufacturing. Thus the exclusion list attempts to protect local industries from being 
adversely affected by competition from European duty-free goods.296  
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The SADC-EPA group on the other hand is required to liberalize 80% of its trade with the EU. Its 
market access timetable comprises of two different lists. The first list pertains to the SACU 
region, specifically, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa.297 The second 
deals with Mozambique, which has a market access schedule that was established in 2007. The 
two market access schedules in question are still yet to be amalgamated and thus remain 
distinguished. Nonetheless, there is an annex to the EPA text requiring Mozambique to amend 
its Tariff nomenclature and later provide a modified tariff schedule consisting of the staging 
classifications proposed by it during the negotiation period of the EPAs.298  
Furthermore, South Africa also has a different market access schedule form the rest of the 
SADC-EPA group. Interestingly although Mozambique and the BLNS have complete duty free 
and quota free entry to the EU for all goods (excluding arms) South Africa has a much more 
challenging tariff schedule. It consists of exclusions and tariff staging liberalization covering up 
to 11 years and more.  
Moreover the EPA which pertains to South Africa contains 60% duty free coverage for 
agricultural products and 98% for industrial products.299 Although on the other hand the BNLS 
gain from duty free and quota free access to the EU market, they however were compelled to 
make extra strides to open their market for certain products they constituted as sensitive. This 
occurred due to the EU’s strong interest for these same goods from South Africa.300 Hence to 
alleviate all possible adverse effects that imports from the EU would have on these goods, the 
BLNS succeeded in obtaining a transitional safeguard clause for a number of specific goods. 
According to SADC-EPA agreement, it consists of certain vegetables and fruits, cocoa, frozen 
chicken, etc. This signified a major political concession to the advantage of the BLNS states 
especially because they were requested to make considerably greater attempts to liberalize 
their markets in order to maintain a joint schedule with South Africa.  
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5.2 Policy space 
The disproportionate feature of the SADC-EPA and ECOWAS gives room for a particular number 
of goods to be exempt from liberalization. In respect to ECOWAS states it symbolizes goods 
regarded as sensitive (subject to a CET of 35%) for a sum of 25% for all tariffs.301 Additionally 
members would remain gaining from tariff protection to permit indigenous value additions and 
transformation. However in the case of SADC-EPA 20% of trade is exempt which also signifies 
vital sensitivity.  
Furthermore the agreement provides an amount of policy space for states to protect their 
domestic economies in the situation that imports from the EU pose a threat to their local 
industries. This is attainable with the utilization of trade defense instruments specifically by 
using safeguard measures.  The ECOWAS-EPA has a particular safeguard clause for emerging 
local industries whereas the SADC-EPA configuration has a particular safe guard clause including 
the BLNS international safeguard clause.  
Additionally both the SADC-EPAs and ECOWAS-EPA have pliability for states to impose export 
taxes in exceptional situations.302 Especially when there is a goal to support infant industries, 
address certain revenue needs or for the protection of the environment. ECOWAS for example 
may apply this flexibility of increasing duties on exports only provisionally and on a restricted 
number of goods after notifying the EU.  
On the other hand the SADC-EPA text on export taxes permits Mozambique and BLNS states to 
apply these taxes for the protection of the environment or infant industries, special revenue 
needs or for the respite of crucial local and general shortages of foodstuff or in simpler terms, 
to guarantee food security. Nonetheless all SADC-EPA countries, have the capability to possibly 
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impose export taxes on a restricted number of goods once they can prove it’s for industrial 
development purposes.303 Provisional duties can only be imposed on a sum of eight goods for 
each SADC-EPA country at an allocated time and for no more than 12 years. Nevertheless there 
are two conditions that apply to the use of this measure i.e. the export duties must not surpass  
10% of the ad valorem export value of the product and products excluded from export duties 
are due to be processed in the EU and must not be re-exported to third party states. 
Interestingly, this clause is only specific to the SADC-EPA and is not included in the ECOWAS 
text.  
Another, interesting area to highlight pertaining to policy space is the MFN clause.  Although 
the SADC-EPA group and ECOWAS raised several concerns, both agreements eventually 
comprised of an MFN clause.304 It is however imperative to note that the clause is not 
unavoidable for SADC and ECOWAS states as the agreement establishes that all future 
preferences are to be assessed in advance of extending it to the EU.305 Furthermore it exempts 
agreements among certain major trading partners including ACP states and other developing 
countries as well as the different African regions and LDCs.  
The term “major trading partners”306 within ECOWAS EPA is considered to be one whose 
portion of global trade is greater than 1.5 and whose level of industrialization/ development 
determined by value manufacturing in GDP as being more than 10% prior to the establishment 
of the EPA.  
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In the SADC-EPA a major trading partner is perceived as any state whose global portion of 
merchandise export is more than 1% before the EPA is enforced.307 Prior to any extension, the 
SADC-EPA configuration would have to prove that it has given considerably higher favorable 
treatment to the major trading state.  
The MFN clause however is solely associated with fees, customs duties, and other charges. 
Areas like regulatory measures or rules of origin are not considered. Hence, it makes it 
problematic on the basis of tariffs alone especially in circumstances where tariffs are already 
too low to determine preferences.308  
 
 Financial Support and Development 
The ECOWAs EPA reinforced PAPED (the West African Development Programme) which is the 
wide-ranging development agenda that will tackle probable issues that may arise with the 
institution of the EPAs.309 It is meant to be implemented through two key instruments, namely  
I. A competiveness observatory which is due to be created utilizing performance 
indicators to track and assess the effect of the EPA, 
II. The establishment of a regional EPA fund to ensure the right channeling of the 
funds.310 
Furthermore in regards to financial support the European Investment Bank and EC coupled with 
its member countries are expected to provide aide to the PAPED in the period of 2015-2019 for 
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a minimum of 6.5 billion Euros.311 The support will be tailored towards agriculture, 
infrastructure, capacity building for developing civil society including energy and trade.  
Nonetheless although the SADC-EPA has a section and development cooperation, no financial 
commitment has been made so far and there is no equivalent to ECOWAS PAPED.312 It is clear 
that parties consent to the need for a regional development financial mechanism like an EPA 
find that there are no commitments or potential additional sources of revenues. There is all the 
same some acknowledgement of the possible financial effects of tariff phase down on SADC-
EPA states especially LDCs like Lesotho but no substantial commitment has been shown 
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5.4 Effects on regional integration in Africa  
Based on the intricacies and gaps between ECOWAS-EPA and SADC EPA, the following are the 
potential effects it will generally have on regional integration in the continent as a whole.  
I. Special and differential treatment compromised  
It is stipulated that the EPAs are to propel African states towards speedy trade liberalization. 
However the EPAs are also likely to challenge the necessity for diverse tariff reduction rates for 
the various regional member states through their unique negotiated trade arrangements.313 
Gradual, differential tariff and variable reductions of this nature are principally designed to 
provide a degree of protection and security to weaker traders and producers within a region. 
Furthermore they are essentially formulated to reverse the privileges more economically 
developed regional member states enjoy for example South Africa in SADC or Nigeria in 
ECOWAS.314 In actual fact the EPA does not necessarily facilitate free trade neither is the 
professed objective for RECs to establish personal free trade areas ahead of the EPAs suitable 
for regions that integrate high disproportional developed states.     
II. Internal markets penetrated and eroded  
Exposing African markets to highly competitive European exporters and producers will impose 
immense pressure on African traders and producers within their internal markets.315 This has 
been apparent with the present degrees of external trade liberalization by means of the WTO 
tariff reduction laws, the World Bank’s SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs) and the IMF 
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(International Monetary Fund).316 Moreover outside pressures of this kind on national 
producers and traders, it will also affect their prospects in the internal markets of other states 
in the same regional community.  In the Southern African case, the preferential access that 
South African traders enjoy to the close-by larger and richer South African market will be 
eroded.317 In this manner, trade liberalization caused by the EPA will destabilize one of the 
fundamental objectives of regional integration. Which is simple element is to establish enlarged 
and combined markets to facilitate the expansion of inter-regional trade and support regional, 
national and local producers. 
III. Administrative costs and burdens 
Practically the EC’s backing of integrated free trade arrangements in the African continent will 
compel their rapidity and trigger them too early into regional FTAs.318 Hence it will be 
challenging to manage the flow of international imports in the entire region especially from 
member states that have lower external tariffs. A vast disparity amongst neighboring states has 
been due to the outcome of inter alia, independent trade liberalization and the World Bank’s 
structural adjustment programs including the IMF.319 More so that, these disparities are likely 
to be exacerbated due to the wide-ranging unilateral state trade liberalization scheme with the 
EU under the EPAs i.e. the IEPAs. The augmented movement of these international imports into 
singular member countries of all the different FTA regions in the continent will compound the 
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burdens of intra-regional border controls and administrative costs.320 Likewise, it will make 
complex managing rules of origin of imports from states in the same regional configuration.  
IV. Common external tariff challenges  
Conversely, the cross border leakage of global imports from one state to another within one 
region can usually be addressed by assenting to a CET arrangement.321  Nevertheless 
negotiations surrounding a CET are exceptionally challenging between disproportional 
economies and economies with diverse international or external trade policies.322 Hitherto, in 
principle the expeditious formulation of single CETs are necessary for discussions on joint 
regional tariff arrangements with the EU, especially if it is the goal the various regions finally 
aspire towards. The main problem however is whether such common external tariffs are going 
to be established at a suitable speed through negotiated intra-regional agreements, or by a 
piece meal process through the formation of a number of bilateral external trade agreements 
with the EU.323  
 
V. Potential EU financial and technical aid manipulated  
Besides the numerous practical issues and policy quandaries, the EC guarantees the 
governments of African states that they can count on EU production, research activities 
investment and planning; supported by the EU’s technical and financial development assistance 
to address the problems that are likely to occur.324 These regulations overheads that 
accompany extensive and rapid liberalization are expected to be catered for by the EU’s many 
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financial schemes and it’s Aid for Trade. It is however, no secret that African states have been 
highly dependent on the EU for financial support, a habit that has caused it to be constantly 
vulnerable to enter into unprofitable trade negotiations. Thus in their perennial petition for 
more aid they result to “adjustment costs”325 that are simply intense social and economic 
disruptions to the regional integration process which is designed to make Africa states less 
dependent.326  
 
VI. Regional services cooperation countered  
It is important to however note that EU aid of this nature will destabilize attempts to enhance 
mutual support between member states of the various sub-region and services cooperation. 
The EC’s approach of luring the region to rely and open up their markets to EU companies for 
the provision of services will reverse internally created services capacities and production.327 It 
will further destroy better equipped self-reliant and independent services development. 
Members of regional configurations engaging in services cooperation programs can lead to 
more concrete organic development. This however entails policy space and time. Although it 
does not prevent utilizing services companies from the EU when required, it does necessitate 
the ability to negotiate and decide definite time-bound contracts with specific EU service 
companies. Additionally, it entails the capacity to enter and function in accordance with their 
personal business resolutions.  In several ways, trade in services is a camouflaged form of 
investment and this is hence, coupled with the assurance of a transfer of their financial 
privileges back to their home bases.328 A process the EU is facilitating through the 
establishment of EPAs.  
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VII. A complex process contracted and redirected 
There are several more joint legal, political, economic, environmental and socio-economic 
elements that are pertinent to establish comprehensive, well-rooted and fully functional 
development procedures. They constitute the intricate requirements necessary to create 
development communities separate from ordinary investment and trade markets. Within the 
control of the present international investment and global trade and growth regime, the 
governmental policy makers, including the independent academic analysis in the continent are 
progressively focusing on market building. This is a shift from the usual concentration on 
community creating phases of their regional programs and plans. Hence the EPA’s focus on 
liberalization centered on trade, investment and services will undeniably intensify the re-
direction of African RECs.  
 
 
VIII. An extended and incremental process curtailed 
Lastly, these convoluted intra-regional procedures necessitate complex inter-governmental 
negotiations, research, frequent amendments and adjustments, planning including discussions 
with the involvement of all regional and national stakeholders.329  Despite the EU’s personally 
structured procedures of variable and multi-layered regional integration and coordination, it is 
imposing immense pre-emptive demands and pressures African regions and governments. A 
typical example was the enormous pressure to complete negotiation by 2008.330 Furthermore, 
there were counter programs and pressures like “open regionalism.”331 This cause was 
supported by the Word Bank in the early phases of the SAPs being engineered in the continent 
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in the 1980s. Additionally the cross-border liberalization schemes set up in Southern and East 




The relevance of regional integration in the African continent cannot be over emphasized. 
Developing and developed nations have both utilized economic integration to improve the 
standard of living of their people and to further advance their economies. Moreover in order 
for African states to have a higher bargaining power in the global economy, the success of the 
regional integration process is crucial.333 As it would not only facilitate the continent’s 
integration into the global market but additionally aide in bridging the gap between developed 
states and least developed states.  
The EU traditionally has been one of Africa’s most dominant investment, development and 
trade partner. Trade with the European Union was directed by a number of Lomé Conventions. 
These conventions granted majority of African states with the exception of South Africa 
unilateral preferential access to markets in the EU. Due to certain discrepancies with the 
preferential access, African states and the EU eventually concluded the Contonou agreement. 
An agreement that shifted from non-reciprocity to reciprocity and paved the way for the 
negotiation of the EPA in 2000 that was compatible with the WTO.  Several arrangements of 
African states have established negotiating factions; a number of which cut through 
neighbourhood regional integration configurations that are already in existence.  This has 
added further convolution to the development of regional integration in Africa.   
 The prolonged and challenging process surrounding the EPAs has not only mirrored to a 
significant degree, the gap between the EU’s prototype of regional trade agreements and the 
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African paradigm of regional integration but more importantly the challenges of regional 
integration in Africa.334 Furthermore the negotiation for the EPAs highlighted clear disparities 
between political ambitions and the economic reality in the African regional integration 
process.  
Although to some degree the SADC-EPA especially SACU and ECOWAS succeeded in consenting 
on a regional agenda that supports cooperation in the region. It is very uncertain the point to 
which the EPAs will facilitate integration on a broader spectrum i.e. continental integration 
framework.335  
First of all the number of regional configurations and RECs in the continent has been gradually 
increasing. Moreover it is recognizable that many states are members of a number of 
arrangements. Despite certain RECs such as UEMOA, SADC and ECOWAS having taken 
significant strides to achieve rationalization, this key problem still remains essentially 
unaddressed. Thus, leading to a spaghetti bowl of regional groups of which just eight have been 
legitimately acknowledged by the African Union.336  
This causes fragmentation of markets, irrelevant duplication of efforts and functions which 
eventually undermine the potential of RECs to attain effective and coherent integration 
schemes.337 The EPAs have unfortunately contributed to this problem. As previously 
mentioned, only ECOWAS and the EAC were able to negotiate EPAs as a complete regional bloc. 
Thus negotiating full regional EPAs became difficult with other regional blocs especially SADC 
due to the overlapping membership of some states.  
The EPAs in this case have the potential of concealing an inadvertent lock-in effect. This means 
it will hem in states within the region that have negotiated an EPA. In this circumstance it will 
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be difficult for regions to address the overlapping issue or even form larger economic units. For 
example, the SADC-EPA provides for accession for any organization or state to the SADC-EPA. 
Furthermore, the EPAs comprise of a standstill clause that inhibits states from augmenting their 
tariffs in the future above what has been stipulated in the EPAs.  
Thus, hypothetically, if ECOWAS and SADC in future agree to harmonize their trade regimes to 
create a bigger customs union they will face major impediments. This will be evident in the 
attempt to align their market access schedule without annulling the EPAs in their present 
condition.338 All these challenges surrounding the institution of Free trade areas among African 
regional economic communities indicate that it is more probable for EPA regions to extend a 
greater favorable treatment to the EU than they would to their own regional partners. This 
however has the potential to significantly lower the level of intra-African trade, an undesirable 
state of affairs, considering that intra-African trade is a key objective to solidifying the regional 
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